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779 
COMMENTS 
To Agree or Not to Agree: Treatment of Postnuptial 
Agreements Under Oklahoma Law 
I. Introduction 
The conversation where parents inform their children they are getting 
divorced has become all-too-common in American homes.  A recent 
study revealed that in 2008, 7.1 out of 1,000 Americans got married, 
while 3.5 out of every 1,000 Americans got divorced.1  Further, studies 
showed that between 41% to 50% of first marriages will end in divorce, 
with the percentage increasing to between 60% to 67% of second 
marriages, and 73% to 74% of third marriages.2  With these statistics in 
mind, the concern that prospective or current spouses may have for 
individually defined property rights in the case of divorce is not so far-
fetched.  Statistics support the conclusion that the use of prenuptial 
agreements C agreements entered into before marriage C are on the rise 
in America:  in 2005 approximately 5,000 prenuptial agreements were 
entered into per month, a significant jump from 1,500 in 2003.3  When 
spouses fail to execute an agreement before marriage, they often feel a 
need to do so during marriage.  This type of agreement is called a 
postnuptial agreement.  Postnuptial agreements are increasing in use as 
well; according to a poll conducted by the American Academy of 
Matrimonial Lawyers, the number of postnuptial agreements has 
increased by 50% between the years of 2002B2007.4  A postnuptial 
agreement can take one of two forms: (1) modification of an existing 
prenuptial agreement through a valid postnuptial agreement, or (2) 
execution of a postnuptial agreement without a prior prenuptial 
agreement. 
                                                                                                                 
1. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, MARRIAGE & DIVORCE 1 (2009), http:// 
www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/divorce.htm.  This divorce number, however, does reflect a 
national low since 1970. Id. 
2.  Divorce Rate, 1 (2009), http://www.divorcerate.org/.  
3. Jean Chatzky, For Richer or Poorer, Unless We Get Divorced (2006), http:// 
money.cnn.com/magazines/moneymag/moneymag_archive/2006/04/01/8373333/index.htm. 
4. Robert DiGiacomo, Quit Fighting B Get a Postnuptial Agreement (2008), http://www. 
cnn.com/2008/LIVING/personal/04/02/postnuptial.agreement/index.html.  The primary 
difference in the two forms of marital contracts hinges on the timing the agreement is 
entered into.  A prenuptial agreement is entered into before marriage, BLACK'S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1301 (9th ed. 2009), and a postnuptial agreement is an agreement that is made 
after marriage. Id. at 1286.   
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Although technically different, both prenuptial and postnuptial 
agreements share the common objective of defining the distribution of 
property rights upon the dissolution of a marriage, through either death 
or divorce.  Despite this similarity, the two agreements have not 
received the same treatment under the law.  While prenuptial agreements 
are valid in all fifty states, approximately twenty-two states have 
addressed whether postnuptial agreements are valid C with the majority 
finding they are valid.5  Of the states that do not recognize postnuptial 
agreements, there does not appear to be any single common variable as 
to why such agreements are invalid. 
A simple hypothetical helps to illustrate a typical situation where a 
postnuptial agreement might be employed and demonstrates the 
uncertainties surrounding its treatment under the law.  Suppose Matthew 
and Lisa, Oklahoma residents, enter into a valid prenuptial agreement 
before their marriage.  The prenuptial agreement includes two 
provisions that deal with the distribution of property rights upon 
divorce: (1) each spouse’s respective property acquired prior to marriage 
will remain the sole property of that individual, (both during marriage 
and upon divorce); and (2) in the event of divorce, each spouse will 
retain a proportionate interest in property acquired after marriage based 
on each spouse’s initial investment in the property. 
After marriage, the couple decides to buy a house worth $500,000.  
Matthew contributes $350,000 to the house C an investment equal to 
                                                                                                                 
5.  The following states have addressed whether postnuptial agreements can be valid: 
Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, 
Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New York, 
Ohio, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, and Wisconsin.  See ALA. CODE '' 30-4-9, 43-8-72 
(West 2009); ALASKA STAT. ' 13.12.213 (West 2009); ARK. CODE ANN. '' 9-11-406, 9-11-
502 (West 2009); CAL. FAM. CODE ' 1500 (West 2009); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. ' 15-11-
207 (West 2009); FLA. STAT. ANN. ' 732.702 (West 2009); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
5/502 (West 2009); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. ' 403.180(1) (West 2009); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 
Ch. 209, ' 2 (West 2009); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. ' 557.23 (West 2009); MISS. CODE ANN. 
' 93-3-1 (West 2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. ' 3103.06 (West 2009); Tibbs v. Anderson, 
580 So. 2d 1337, 1339 (Ala. 1991); In re Estate of Harber, 449 P.2d 7, 12 (Ariz. 1969); 
Perkins v. Sunset Tel. & Tel. Co, 103 P. 190, 193-94 (Cal. 1909); In re Estate of Lewin, 595 
P.2d 1055, 1057 (Colo. 1979); Flansburg v. Flansburg, 581 N.E.2d 430, 433 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1991); Dunsworth v. Dunsworth, 81 P.2d 9, 12 (Kan. 1938); see Pearre v. Grossnickle, 114 
A. 725, 728 (Md. 1921); Lipic v. Lipic, 103 S.W.3d 144, 149 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003); 
Bronfman v. Bronfman, 229 A.D.2d 314, 315 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996); Keith v. Keith, 156 
N.W. 910, 911 (S.D. 1916); Bratton v. Bratton, 136 S.W.3d 595 (Tenn. 2004); Pierce v. 
Pierce, 994 P.2d 193, 198 (Utah 2000); Button v. Button, 388 N.W.2d 546, 550 (Wis. 1986).  
While Oklahoma has addressed the issue, the case law on the validity of postnuptial 
agreements is unclear.  See infra nn. 7-9 and Part IV. 
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70% of the house’s value C and Lisa contributes the remaining 
$150,000 C an investment equal to 30% of the house’s value.  Thus, 
under the second provision of the prenuptial agreement, Matthew would 
receive 70% of the value of the property upon divorce and Lisa would 
receive 30%.  Now assume tension arises between the spouses.  Lisa 
becomes very fearful that in the event of divorce she will not be able to 
support herself due to Matthew’s greater interest in their marital 
property.  Matthew does not want to see his wife worry, nor does he 
believe that the couple’s marriage will end in divorce.  In an attempt to 
put all worries to rest, Matthew proposes making a postnuptial 
agreement through an amendment to their prenuptial agreement.  He 
suggests the postmarital property be divided evenly (50% to him and 
50% to Lisa) in the event of divorce.6  Matthew and Lisa both feel good 
about the proposed change to their prenuptial agreement.  However, a 
very important question crosses their minds: Can they legally use a 
postnuptial agreement to alter their prenuptial agreement? 
While this might appear to be a simple contractual issue C the couple 
only wants to modify an existing contract C appearances are often 
deceptive.  Although postnuptial agreements contain characteristics of 
an ordinary contract, determining whether traditional principles of 
contract law govern such agreements is not as clear-cut as it might seem.  
Two different Oklahoma courts have addressed this very issue,7 
reaching two very different determinations: one holding that spouses can 
alter their property rights through postnuptial agreements,8 and the other 
holding that Oklahoma law does not allow spouses to alter their property 
rights postnuptially.9 
This comment first explores the various legal principles used by 
courts nationwide to determine the validity of postnuptial agreements.  
This comment then discusses the applicability of those principles under 
Oklahoma law.  This comment argues that, although postnuptial 
agreements are a special contract, much like their prenuptial 
counterparts, postnuptial agreements can be valid, and basic principles 
                                                                                                                 
6. This is a simplified hypothetical, but it serves the purpose of highlighting a situation 
when a couple might want to amend or modify a prenuptial agreement. Realistically, 
situations surrounding modifications of prenuptial agreements are far more complex and 
involve many factors and interests. 
7.  See, e.g., Hendrick v. Hendrick, 1999 OK CIV APP 15, 976 P.2d 1071 (Okla. Civ. 
App. Div. 1 1998); Boyer v. Boyer, 1996 OK CIV APP 94, 925 P.2d 82 (Okla. Civ. App. 
Div. 4 1996). 
8.  See Boyer, 1996 OK CIV APP 94, 925 P.2d 82. 
9.  See Hendrick, 1999 OK CIV APP 15, 976 P.2d 1071. 
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that govern the validity of prenuptial agreements should be applied to 
the analysis required to determine whether individual postnuptial 
agreements are valid.  Further, this comment suggests requirements that 
should be met in order to create a valid postnuptial agreement. 
A firm grasp on the nature of prenuptial agreements is essential to 
fully understanding the issues facing postnuptial agreements; thus, Part 
II of this comment discusses the legal development of prenuptial 
agreements through the United States.  Part III provides a detailed 
analysis of the historical development of postnuptial agreements in the 
United States and the jurisprudence surrounding postnuptial agreements 
nationwide.  Part IV discusses Oklahoma’s current statutory and 
common law relevant to postnuptial validity and presents the 
contradictory stances taken by Oklahoma’s appellate courts.  Part V 
proposes justifications for why postnuptial agreements can and should 
be valid under Oklahoma law, and then suggests specific requirements 
to make a valid postnuptial agreement.  This comment concludes in Part 
VI by suggesting that Oklahoma establish clear precedent that 
postnuptial agreements can be valid and detail what elements are 
required to make a valid postnuptial agreement. 
 II. History of Prenuptial Agreements 
A. Historical Background of Prenuptial Agreements 
The development of prenuptial agreements within the United States 
originated in the Statute of Uses, a seventeenth-century English law.10  
The Statute of Uses allowed a woman to waive her right to dower C that 
is, to waive her right to receive a one-third interest in her husband’s 
estate for life C upon the death of her husband.11  Originally, a wife was 
not considered an heir of her husband; thus, when a husband died the 
wife had no interest in his estate and consequently, little means to 
provide for herself.12  The Statute of Uses effectively functioned as a 
prenuptial agreement to waive a woman’s right to dower. 
In the United States, statutes modeled after the Statute of Uses were 
enacted that allowed a woman to waive her right to dower.13  Prenuptial 
                                                                                                                 
10. See generally LAURA W. MORGAN & BRETT R. TURNER, ATTACKING AND DEFENDING 
MARITAL AGREEMENTS 361-64 (2001). 
11. See MORGAN, supra note 10, at 362. 
12. JOHN E. CRIBBET ET AL., PROPERTY CASES AND MATERIALS 324 (7th ed. 1996) (1960). 
13. MORGAN, supra note 10, at 364; see also B. Bernard Wolson, Husband and 
WifeCAntenuptial Contracts, 41 MICH. L. REV. 1133, 1134 (1943). 
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agreements that waived a woman’s right to dower were not initially 
subjected to a high level of scrutiny.14  For example, in Reiger v. 
Schaible, the Supreme Court of Nebraska held that agreements that 
waived the right to dower were valid as long as the agreement was fair, 
equitable, and entered into in good faith.15  Although such prenuptial 
agreements were used solely to waive a woman’s right to dower, these 
agreements would eventually be used to create, relinquish, or alter 
property rights between prospective spouses.16 
Generally speaking, prenuptial agreements covering any right other 
than the right to dower had a very weak existence before the Married 
Women’s Property Act.17  Most commentators agree that the Married 
Women’s Property Act resulted in the modern form of the prenuptial 
agreement, which began to receive acceptance in the legal community.18  
Before the nineteenth century, a husband would receive, upon marriage, 
a substantial interest in all real and personal property his wife owned 
before marriage.19  Under the Married Women’s Property Act, however, 
women were given the right to enter into contracts with respect to their 
property because the act gave women an ownership interest in their 
premarital and postmarital property.20  Also enacted in the same time 
period was the Earning Statute, which allowed women to work outside 
of the home for a wage and to receive that wage themselves.21  These 
two acts gave women greater freedom and ability to negotiate with their 
spouses when it came to defining marital-property rights. 
Despite the changing legal landscape regarding marital contracts, the 
ability of spouses to contractually define their property rights was not 
widely accepted.  For much of the history of prenuptial agreements, an 
agreement contemplating divorce as the means of dissolution to 
marriage (as opposed to death) was considered invalid as against public 
policy.22  Courts justified such positions by asserting that prenuptial 
                                                                                                                 
14.  See Reiger v. Schaible, 115 N.W. 560 (Neb. 1908). 
15.  Id. at 566. 
16.  Irvine v. Irvine, 685 N.E.2d 67, 70 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). 
17.  Married Women’s Property Act, 1882, c. 75, '' 1-27 (Eng.). 
18.  Suzanne D. Albert, The Perils of Premarital Provisions, 48 R.I. B.J. 5, 5 (2000). 
19. See CAROLYN R. BARONE & ROBERT D. OSTER, DRAFTING AND LITIGATING 
PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENTS IN RHODE ISLAND 3 (1996). 
20. See BARONE & OSTER, supra note 19, at 3 (1996); see generally NORMA BAUSCH, IN 
THE EYES OF THE LAW (1987). 
21. See Katharine B. Silbaugh, Marriage Contracts and the Family Economy, 93 NW. U. 
L. REV. 65, 71 (1998). 
22. Rebecca Glass, Trading Up: Postnuptial Agreements, Fairness, and a Principled 
New Suitor for California, 92 CAL. L. REV. 215, 221 (2004). 
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agreements that contemplated divorce would ruin the sanctity of 
marriage and “lead to endless, minor litigation, and encourage the 
property-owning spouse to desert the other spouse.”23  Thus, the 
common law approach to prenuptial agreements was skeptical and 
paternalistic.24  However, this began to subside with the continued 
progression of women’s rights and treatment in society. 
Given the rise of women’s equality, the number of women in the work 
place, and the growing contractual rights of women,25 the Florida 
Supreme Court concluded in Posner v. Posner that prenuptial 
agreements contemplating divorce were no longer per se void as against 
public policy.26  Other courts began to follow the trend established by 
the Florida Supreme Court.27  The adoption of the Uniform Premarital 
Agreement Act (UPAA) in 1983 provided evidence of state legislatures 
viewing prenuptial agreements in a different light.28  The UPAA was an 
attempt to establish conformity among states in treating prenuptial 
agreements as simply a form of a contract.29  The most notable right the 
UPAA promulgated was that of prospective spouses to control their 
marital contracts, specifically including a couple’s ability to control 
property rights in virtually any situation not violating public policy.30  
                                                                                                                 
23. Glass, supra note 22, at 92; see also Charles W. Gamble, The Antenuptial Contract, 
26 U. MIAMI L. REV. 692, 704-05 (1971). 
24. Allison A. Marston, Planning for Love: The Politics of Prenuptial Agreements, 49 
STAN. L. REV. 887, 891 (1997); see also Estate of Burgess, 1982 OK CIV APP 22, & 10, 646 
P.2d 623, 625. 
25. Gail Frommer Brod, Premarital Agreements and Gender Justice, 6 YALE J.L. & 
FEMINISM 229, 253 (1994). 
26.  Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381, 285 (Fla. 1970). 
27. See Brooks v. Brooks, 733 P.2d 1044, 1048 (Alaska 1987); Newman v. Newman, 653 
P.2d 728 (Colo.1982); Scherer v. Scherer, 292 S.E.2d 662 (Ga. 1982); In re Bowen, 475 
N.E.2d 690 (Ind. 1985); In re Adams, 729 P.2d 1151 (Kan. 1986); Gross v. Gross, 11 Ohio 
St. 3d 99, 464 N.E.2d 500 (Ohio 1984). 
28. The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act references & annotations, 9C U.L.A. 35 
(2001), lists twenty-five states and the District of Columbia which adopted and enforced the 
UPAA.  The twenty-five states include: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, 
Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Maine, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, 
New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, South 
Dakota, Texas, Utah, and Virginia. Id.  In Dematteo v. Dematteo, 762 N.E.2d 797, 809 n.28 
(Mass. 2002), however, twenty-eight states and the District of Columbia are listed as 
adopting and enforcing the UPAA.  This footnote concludes that, along with the twenty-five 
states listed above, four additional states have adopted and enforced the UPAA. Those four 
states are: Iowa, Mississippi, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id. 
29. Allison A. Marston, Planning for Love: The Politics of Prenuptial Agreements, 49 
STAN. L. REV. 887, 899 (1997). 
30.  Unif. Premarital Agreement Act ' 3 (amended 2001), 9C U.L.A. 43 (1983). 
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Alongside growing acceptance of prenuptial agreements in different 
contexts, requirements were imposed in order to create a valid 
prenuptial agreement. 
B. Legal Requirements of a Valid Prenuptial Agreement 
Prenuptial agreements are simply contracts; therefore offer, 
acceptance, and consideration must be present.31  The elements of offer 
and acceptance are normally non-issues; whereas consideration, an area 
that once provided for dispute, is viewed as fulfilled by the marriage 
itself.32  There are generally four additional requirements of a valid 
prenuptial agreement: (1) the agreement does not violate public policy; 
(2) the agreement is entered into voluntarily; (3) there is a full and fair 
disclosure of assets before signing an agreement; and (4) the agreement 
is substantively fair and conscionable.  It should be noted that not all 
states require all the elements.33  Normally states require some 
combination of the following. 
1. Public Policy 
Prenuptial agreements may not violate public policy.  One way a 
prenuptial agreement may violate public policy is if the agreement 
encourages divorce.34  An agreement that denies a party a divorce if 
                                                                                                                 
31.  Id. ' 2. 
32.  See Roberts v. Roberts, 802 So. 2d 230, 233 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001); Eule v. Eule, 320 
N.E.2d 506, 509 (Ill. Ct. App. 1974); Watson v. Watson, 497 A.2d 794, 801 (Md. 1984); 
Matter of Burgess’ Estate, 1982 OK CIV APP 22, & 16, 646 P.2d 623, 626 (Okla. Civ. App. 
1982); Bratton v. Bratton, 136 S.W.3d 595, 600 (Tenn. 2004); Friedlander v. Friedlander, 
494 P.2d 208, 300 (Wash. 1972). 
33. See Griffin v. Griffin, 2004 OK CIV APP 58, 94 P.3d 96, 99 (holding an agreement 
must either be fair and reasonable from the position of the party opposing enforcement, or 
there must be a full and fair disclosure of the other party’s financial position); Chiles v. 
Chiles, 779 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. App. 1989) (holding whether a prenuptial agreement is fair is 
immaterial to determining enforceability of such agreement), rev’d on other grounds, 790 
S.W.2d 819 (Tex. App. 1990);  Dexter v. Dexter, 371 S.E.2d 816 (Va. Ct. App. 1988) 
(holding pre- or postnuptial agreements can be void if against public policy). 
34.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ' 190(2) (1981). A contract that tends to 
encourage divorce is unreasonable as against public policy. See In re Noghrey, 215 Cal. 
Rptr. 153 (Ct. App. 1985) (holding an agreement that gave a wife certain assets that were 
large in comparison to the marital estate was invalid); Dexter, 371 S.E.2d 816 (stating in 
dicta a clause of a marital agreement that required husband to pay wife $1,000 per month 
upon separation or divorce that was large in comparison to the marital estate is 
unenforceable); Coggins v. Coggins, 601 So. 2d 109 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992) (holding a 
prenuptial agreement that encouraged divorce by awarding one party a disproportionate 
share of the marital estate was invalid). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2011
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grounds exist for divorce, however, is also against public policy.35  
Other situations may exist where a prenuptial agreement may be void as 
violating public policy.36  For example, in Favort v. Barnes, a Louisiana 
appellate court held that a prenuptial agreement that attempted to control 
the behavior of spouses by limiting sexual intercourse to once a week 
was unenforceable.37  Also, in In Re Marriage of Fox, a Washington 
appellate court held it was against public policy, and thus unenforceable, 
for prenuptial agreements to affect visitation or child support rights.38  
Some state legislatures have cleared any confusion surrounding what 
kind of agreements may violate public policy by simply holding that a 
prenuptial agreement cannot be held void solely due to public policy 
concerns.39 
2. Voluntary Execution 
Prenuptial agreements must be entered into and executed voluntarily 
in order to be upheld as valid.40  Courts hold that spouses maintain a 
confidential relationship when entering into a prenuptial agreement.41  
This presumption of a confidential relationship in prenuptial agreements 
is of unique importance because it confers the status of a special 
contract.42  Traditionally, when parties sign a business contract it is 
                                                                                                                 
35.  Towles v. Towles, 182 S.E.2d 53 (S.C. 1971). 
36.  See Lacks v. Lacks, 189 N.E.2d 487 (N.Y. 1963) (holding a prenuptial agreement 
was not enforceable because it purported to establish term where one spouse was to pay the 
other); Boyer v. Boyer, 1996 OK CIV APP 94, 925 P.2d 82 (Okla. Civ. App. Div. 4 1996) 
(holding the agreement cannot change a spouse’s duty to support the other spouse). 
37.  See Favort v. Barnes, 332 So. 2d 873 (La. Ct. App. 1976). 
38.  See In Re Marriage of Fox, 795 P.2d 1170 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990). 
39.  See Griffin v. Griffin, 2004 OK CIV APP 58, & 11, 94 P.3d 96, 99 (interpreting the 
effects of the state legislature’s amendment to the pertinent statute as having the effect of 
creating no public policy bar to prenuptial agreements). 
40.  McHugh v. McHugh, 436 A.2d 8 (Conn. 1980). 
41.  See Hamilton v. Hamilton, 51 So. 2d 13, 188 (Ala. 1950); Burnes v. Burnes, 157 
S.W.2d 24, 27 (Ark. 1942); Linker v. Linker, 470 P.2d 921 (Colo. Ct. App. 1970); Lutgert v. 
Lutgert, 338 So. 2d 1111, 1115 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Watson v. Watson, 126 N.E.2d 
220, 222 (Ill. 1955); Christians v. Christians, 44 N.W.2d 431, 433 (Iowa 1950); Martin v. 
Farber, 510 A.2d 608 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986); Estate of Serbus v. Serbus, 324 N.W.2d 
381, 385 (Minn. 1982) (overruled on the ground that lack of an opportunity to consult with 
independent counsel does not automatically cause a prenuptial agreement to valid); Manhart 
v. Manhart, 1986 OK 12, & 30, 725 P.2d 1234, 1238-39; Button v. Button, 388 N.W.2d 546, 
550 (Wis. 1986). 
42.  See Hamilton, 51 So. 2d at 188; Burnes, 157 S.W.2d at 27; Linker, 470 P.2d 921; 
Lutgert, 338 So. 2d at 1115; Watson, 126 N.E.2d at 222; Christians, 44 N.W.2d at 433; 
Martin, 510 A.2d 608; Estate of Serbus, 324 N.W.2d at 385; Manhart, & 30, 725 P.2d at 
1238-39; Button, 388 N.W.2d at 550. 
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assumed each party has considered his best interests and acted in a 
manner consistent with those interests.43  When prospective spouses 
decide to enter into a prenuptial agreement, however, those spouses may 
not be thinking in terms of their best interest but instead may be driven 
by their emotions.44 
The law combats this potential lack of self-interest by holding that 
prospective spouses are in a confidential relationship.45  This 
confidential relationship imposes upon the parties the duty to act as 
fiduciaries.46  Although the meaning of “fiduciary relationship” is 
vague, it appears that the requirement is not as concerned with 
substantive fairness as it is with procedural fairness.47  For example, in 
Sumpter v. Kosinski, a Michigan appellate court held that disparity of 
prenuptial provisions alone would not invalidate the agreement.48  With 
respect to procedural fairness, courts require that an agreement be 
entered into voluntarily to satisfy the fiduciary duty.49  Courts consider 
three elements when determining if an agreement is voluntary: (1) time 
given to sign the agreement; (2) ability to consult independent counsel; 
and (3) presence of fraud, misrepresentation, and duress.50 
Spouses must be given a fair amount of time to sign a prenuptial 
agreement.51  The primary focus of this requirement revolves around 
when a prenuptial agreement is presented to a spouse to sign and when 
the agreement must ultimately be signed.52  For example, in both Ohio 
and Florida courts determined that a prenuptial agreement was not 
entered into voluntarily because the wife did not know about the 
                                                                                                                 
43.  See MORGAN, supra note 10, at 396 (2001). 
44.  See Sumpter v. Kosinski, 419 N.W.2d 463, 471 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988) (finding when 
individuals are dealing with matters of the heart often times the advice of legal counsel is 
often disregarded). 
45.  See Hamilton, 51 So. 2d at 188; Burnes, 157 S.W.2d at 27; Linker, 470 P.2d 921; 
Lutgert, 338 So. 2d at 1115; Watson, 126 N.E.2d at 222; Christians, 44 N.W.2d at 433; 
Martin, 510 A.2d 608; Estate of Serbus, 324 N.W.2d at 385; Manhart, & 30, 725 P.2d at 
1238-39; Button, 388 N.W.2d at 550. 
46.  See Estate of Serbus, 324 N.W.2d at 385 (describing the relationship of the parties as 
having a fiduciary duty with one another); Watson, 126 N.E.2d at 222 (describing the 
relationship between spouses as one of either confidence or fiduciary). 
47.  See Sumpter, 419 N.W.2d 463 
48.  Id. 
49.  See In re Estate of Lutz, 1997 ND 82, 563 N.W.2d 90 (N.D. 1997). 
50.  See Zimmie v. Zimmie, 464 N.E.2d 142 (Ohio 1984); In re Estate of Lutz, & 34, 563 
N.W.2d 90; Ferry v. Ferry, 586 S.W.2d 782 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979). 
51.  See Plant v. Plant, 320 So. 2d 455, 457-59 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975). 
52.  Zimmie, 464 N.E.2d 142 
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agreement, or was not presented with the agreement until the day before 
the couple was to be married.53 
The nature of the first element of voluntariness C providing a 
reasonable time between presenting a prenuptial agreement and the 
required signing date C is directly related to the second element 
considered when determining voluntariness.  The lack of an opportunity 
to consult independent counsel54 about a prenuptial agreement “is a 
significant factual factor in weighing the voluntariness” of the 
agreement.55  It is the opportunity to consult independent counsel that is 
important in this analysis, as opposed to the actual presence of 
independent counsel when a prenuptial agreement is signed.56  
For example, in Warren v. Warren, the wife challenged the validity of 
a prenuptial agreement upon the dissolution of her marriage with her 
husband.57  The wife claimed she was coerced into signing the 
agreement; however, the court found this claim unpersuasive.58  
Upholding the prenuptial agreement, the court noted the wife had two 
months of ample opportunity to seek independent counsel C but chose 
not to.59  By contrast, if a spouse never had an opportunity to consult 
independent counsel, then a prenuptial agreement will be considered 
involuntary, and thus, the agreement will be unenforceable.60 
The last element of the voluntariness inquiry involves an absence of 
fraud, misrepresentation, or duress surrounding the signing of a 
prenuptial agreement.61  Prenuptial agreements that have been declared 
                                                                                                                 
53.  Id.; Plant, 320 at, 457-59; see also Roberts v. Roberts, 802 So. 2d 230, 233-34 (Ala. 
Civ. App. 2001). 
54.  Independent counsel means counsel of that spouse’s own choosing. Lutgert v. 
Lutgert, 338 So. 2d 1111, 1115 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976). Consulting with the counsel of the 
spouse presenting the prenuptial agreement does not constitute independent counsel. See id. 
55.  In re Estate of Lutz, 1997 ND 82, 563 N.W.2d 90, 98 (N.D. 1997). 
56.  Rhyne-Morris v. Morris, 671 So. 2d 748 (Ala. Civ. App. 1995) (holding the absence 
of independent counsel is not determinative when analyzing the validity of a prenuptial 
agreement); see Cannon v. Cannon, 846 A.2d 1127 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004), cert. granted, 
855 A.2d 349 (Md. 2004) and judgment aff’d, 865 A.2d 563 (Md. 2005) (standing for the 
proposition that a spouse is not required to actually consult independent counsel for a 
prenuptial agreement to be valid). 
57.  Warren v. Warren, 523 N.E.2d 680, 681-82 (Ill. Ct. App. 1988). 
58.  Id. at 683. 
59.  Id. 
60. McMullin v. McMullin, 926 S.W.2d 108 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (holding the prenuptial 
agreement was unenforceable because the wife was never given the opportunity to meet with 
independent counsel). 
61.  See Ferry v. Ferry, 586 S.W.2d 782 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979); Ex Parte Williams, 617 So. 
2d 1033 (Ala. 1992). 
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void based on either fraud or misrepresentation often deal with 
situations where one spouse is presented a prenuptial agreement with 
little time to review its contents and the presenting spouse promises to 
change certain terms or provisions of the agreement after it is signed.62  
In Ferry v. Ferry, the court found the prenuptial agreement void when a 
wife signed the agreement without independent counsel and in reliance 
on a promise by the husband to change certain terms of the agreement 
after marriage.63 
Just as duress is a defense to the enforcement of a traditional contract, 
it is also a defense to the enforcement of a prenuptial agreement.64  
Duress most frequently arises in the prenuptial agreement context when 
the woman is pregnant at the time the prenuptial agreement is 
presented.65  Pregnancy, however, does not constitute duress per se; 
rather, the presence of duress must be determined on a case-by-case 
basis.66  For example, in Hamilton v. Hamilton, the Pennsylvania 
Superior Court concluded that a prenuptial agreement was not signed 
under duress despite the wife’s pregnancy at the time of signing because 
she had received advice of independent counsel and disregarded that 
advice.67  Conversely, a man’s refusal to marry his pregnant fiancé 
unless she signed a prenuptial agreement, coupled with the woman’s 
desire to maintain credibility within the community despite her 
extramarital pregnancy, led one court to find duress was present.68 
3. Full and Fair Disclosure 
Generally spouses are required to make a full and fair disclosure of 
their respective financial conditions before a prenuptial agreement is 
signed.69  This requirement contains two distinct parts.  First, spouses 
are typically required to disclose the nature of their assets to one 
another, such as whether investments are made in stocks, bonds or 
property.70  Second, there must be a full and fair disclosure of an 
                                                                                                                 
62.  See Ferry, 586 S.W.2d at 783. 
63.  Id. at 783, 786-88. 
64.  See Ex Parte Williams, 617 So. 2d 1033. 
65.  See id. 
66.  See Hamilton v. Hamilton, 591 A.2d 720 (Pa. 1991). 
67.  Id. 
68.  Ex Parte Williams, 617 So. 2d 1033. 
69. See Wylie v. Wylie, 459 S.W.2d 127 (Ark. 1970); In re Marriage of Lewis, 808 
S.W.2d 919 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991). 
70. King v. King, 66 S.W.3d 28, 35 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 2001); Matter of Benker’s 
Estate, 331 N.W.2d 193, 196-97 (Mich. 1982). 
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estimation of one’s assets;71 however, this does not require an exact 
determination of net worth.72  Similarly, the disclosure does not require 
each party to offer a detailed list of the nature of each asset individually, 
such as “financial statements of net worth and income . . . .”73  Rather, 
simply a list placing assets into general categories will suffice.74  As 
long as a spouse is given information that represents a general 
approximation of the other spouse’s net worth, a full disclosure has 
occurred.75  Where a disclosure is not made or is not full and fair, the 
prenuptial agreement will be held void.76 
For example, in Wylie v. Wylie, the husband represented that he was 
only worth $200,000, when in fact he was actually worth closer to 
$475,500.77  Finding the prenuptial agreement invalid, the Arkansas 
Supreme Court noted that not only did the wife not know the value of 
the husband’s estate at the time the agreement was signed, but the 
husband acted affirmatively to hide his wealth when he “endeavored to 
prevent her from knowing his actual worth.”78  Similarly, in In re 
Marriage of Lewis, a Missouri appellate court found a husband’s 
disclosure to be inadequate where he disclosed only a list of the assets 
and not values, concluding that the wife could not have known or 
guessed the assets’ values.79 
The duty of prospective spouses to act as fiduciaries, created through 
the presumed confidential relationship, raises another caveat in the full 
and fair disclosure requirement.  Unlike typical contracts, it is generally 
recognized that each spouse has an affirmative duty to make a full and 
fair disclosure C it is not seen as the duty of the other spouse to request 
a disclosure of the other’s assets.80  Although the burden to disclose 
                                                                                                                 
71.  King, 66 at 35; Colonna v. Colonna, 791A.2d 353, 355 (Pa. 2001). 
72.  Griffin v. Griffin, 2004 OK CIV APP 58, & 33-34, 94 P.3d 96, 104 (Okla. Civ. App. 
2004), cert. denied, (May 24, 2004); see also Nanini v. Nanini, 802 P.2d 438 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1990). 
73.  In re Estate of Hill, 335 N.W.2d 750, 753 (Neb. 1983); see Laird v. Laird, 597 P.2d 
463, 468 (Wyo. 1979). 
74.  Id. 
75.  Griffin, & 33-34, 94 P.3d at 104.  
76.  See Wylie v. Wylie, 459 S.W.2d 127, 128-29 (Ark. 1970); In re Marriage of Lewis, 
808 S.W.2d 919, 922 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991). 
77.  Wylie, 459 S.W.2d at 128-29. 
78.  Id. at 130.  Evidence of different circumstances was provided to show the husband 
took active steps to keep his wife from being a part of any discussions of his actual worth.  
79.  In re Marriage of Lewis, 808 S.W.2d at 922. 
80. In re Estate of Lebsock, 618 P.2d 683, 687 (Colo. Ct. App. 1980); Hjortaas v. 
McCabe, 656 So. 2d 168, 170 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Ryken v. Ryken, 461 N.W.2d 
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assets is an affirmative duty placed on both spouses, a prenuptial 
agreement normally will not be ruled invalid simply because one party 
claims the other did not take affirmative action to make a disclosure of 
their assets.81  A failure to disclose assets, without more, will not 
support a finding of fraud or execution of undue influence without 
additional proof to support such a claim.82 
4. Substantive Fairness and Conscionability 
The requirement of substantive fairness and conscionability of a 
prenuptial agreement is concerned with the fairness of the agreement 
itself.83  The scope of this requirement varies among states.  States that 
have adopted the UPAA require a party to show both a full and fair 
disclosure of assets and that a prenuptial agreement is substantively fair 
and conscionable.84  Alternatively, states that have not adopted the 
UPAA may allow a party to show either that the agreement was fair, 
just, and equitable from the other party’s perspective or that the second 
party voluntarily entered into the agreement with full knowledge of the 
first party’s estate and advice from independent counsel.85 
Many states have adopted either a test that holds a prenuptial 
agreement must be substantively “fair”86 or one that holds it must be 
substantively “conscionable.”87  Although the difference in the two 
terms is often just one of degree, it can also be an important distinction 
in certain situations C what might qualify as “unfair” may still be 
classified as “conscionable.”  Whether the court employs a test based on 
fairness or conscionability, a number of the following factors are 
normally considered by the courts: the assets owned by each party, the 
experience or intelligence of each party, each party’s respective standard 
of living during the marriage, the purpose of the agreement, the length 
                                                                                                                 
122,125 (S.D. 1990). 
81.  Freiman v. Freiman, 680 N.Y.S.2d 797, 799 (Sup. Ct. 1998). 
82.  Id. 
83.  See Estate of Harber v. Staley, 449 P.2d 7, 16 (Ariz. 1969); Burtoff v. Burtoff, 418 
So. 2d 1085 (D.C. 1980); Lewis v. Lewis, 748 P.2d 1362 (Haw. 1988); Sande v. Sande, 360 
P.2d 998, 1001 (Idaho 1961); Rose v. Rose, 526 N.E.2d 231 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988); Button v. 
Button, 388 N.W.2d 546 (Wis. 1986). 
84.  Estate of Harber, 449 P.2d at 16; Sande, 360 P.2d at 1001; see also Morgan, supra 
note 10, at 419. 
85.  Tibbs v. Anderson, 580 So. 2d 1337, 1339 (Ala. 1991); Estate of Lewin v. First Nat’l 
Bank of Denver, 595 P.2d 1055, 1058 (Colo. App. 1979); Casto v. Casto, 508 So. 2d 330, 
334 (Fla. 1987). 
86.  Burtoff, 418 So. 2d 1085; Button, 388 N.W.2d 546. 
87.  Lewis, 748 P.2d 1362; Rose, 526 N.E.2d 231. 
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of the marriage, each party’s premarital property, and the type of 
property acquired during marriage.88 
 III. Postnuptial Agreements 
A. Historical Development of Postnuptial Agreements 
At common law, postnuptial agreements were invalid but were often 
enforced in courts of equity.89  Postnuptial agreements were void at 
common law because they traditionally sought to waive rights that had 
not accrued C a woman’s right to dower.90  Additionally, when two 
individuals were married they were no longer viewed as two separate 
individuals, but were merged into one, and a person cannot make a 
contract with himself.91  Further, postnuptial agreements were void as 
against public policy because they promoted divorce.92  Similarly, a 
postnuptial agreement that attempted to release one spouse from her 
legal obligation to support the other was void.93 
Many of the same forces that led to the legal acceptance of prenuptial 
agreements also led to the legal enforceability of postnuptial 
agreements, although at a much slower pace.94  Specifically, the 
development of the Married Women’s Property Act and changing 
societal views of women led a majority of the courts that confronted the 
validity of postnuptial agreements to consider such agreements valid 
under respective state law.95  Courts also began to change their 
perspective on the nature of marriage by encouraging parties to settle 
their disputes privately.96  Although not as commonly used as prenuptial 
                                                                                                                 
88.  See generally Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143 So. 2d 17, 20 (Fla. 1962); In re 
Estate of Hildegass, 244 A.2d 672, 675-76 (Pa. 1968); Button, 388 at 551-52. 
89.  Ficklin’s Adm’r v. Rixey, 17 S.E. 325, 326 (Va. 1893); see also Ruling Case Law 600 
(9th ed. 1915). 
90.  Merchants’ Nat. Bank of Mobile v. Hubbard, 133 So. 723, 727 (Ala. 1931). 
91.  Butterfield v. Stanton, 44 Miss 15 (Miss. Oct Term 1870); see Bendler v. Bendler, 69 
A.2d 302, 305 (N.J. 1949); 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 445 
(Cooley 3d. ed. 1884). 
92. Cumming v. Cumming, 102 S.E. 572, 576 (Va. 1920) (stating such in dicta); In re 
Cooper’s Estate, 403 P.2D 984, 987-88 (Kan. 1965). 
93. Robbins v. Continental Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 58 N.E.2d 254, 259 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1944). 
94.  See Ronald B. Standler, PRENUPTIAL AND POSTNUPTIAL CONTRACT LAW IN THE USA, 
Sept. 12, 2009, http://www.rbs2.com/dcontract.pdf.  
95.  See Paul Brewer, Family Law C Bratton v. Bratton: The Tennessee Supreme Court 
Considers Postnuptial Agreements and Allows Married Parties to Agree That They May 
Eventually Disagree, 35 U. MEM. L. REV. 579, 581-82 (2005);  
96.  Bronfman v. Bronfman, 229 A.D.2d 314, 315 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996). 
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agreements, postnuptial agreements have become a means of addressing 
a very practical problem among spouses: a lack of foresight. 
When spouses are engaged and have not weathered the challenges 
presented by marriage, they often do not consider the hardships that can 
arise during marriage, or they might not be able to foresee specific 
situations as potential problems.97  Postnuptial agreements commonly 
become a means of resolution for tensions that arise from unforeseen 
problems.  For example, one of the most typical difficulties spouses face 
involves marital finances.98  Tension can arise when one or both spouses 
have either a substantial increase (examples might range from the 
common C new business success or inheritance C to the uncommon C 
winning the lottery) or decrease in net worth (usually through some form 
of mounting debt).  Regardless of the couple’s specific reasons for 
entering into a postnuptial agreement, all agreements share one attribute: 
the agreement serves as a means to control one’s financial situation and 
provides a level of certainty and peace of mind. 
Postnuptial agreements are also desirable because many couples view 
a prenuptial agreement as admitting the possibility of divorce, and thus 
they choose to forego the opportunity to execute a prenuptial agreement, 
only to determine later in marriage that some kind of marital contract 
would be very beneficial.  Engaged couples often view life through the 
lens of romanticism rather than realism.  Thus, many do not consider the 
potential need for a prenuptial agreement.  Given the current trends 
within American jurisprudence, many couples are afforded the 
opportunity to enter into an agreement, very similar to a prenuptial 
agreement, after they are married.  Postnuptial agreements allow couples 
to tailor the agreement to their specific needs through first-hand 
experience. 
B. Current Legal Treatment Nationwide 
Approximately twenty-two states have clearly addressed the validity 
of postnuptial agreements.99  States have recognized postnuptial 
                                                                                                                 
97.  Sean Hannon Williams, Postnuptial Agreements, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 827, 828 (2007). 
98.  See Susan Berfield, Does your Marriage Need a Postnup?, BUS. WK., Oct. 2, 2009, 
at 80 (providing an example of a postnuptial agreement that was entered into due to financial 
tensions). 
99.  Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, 
Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New York, 
Ohio, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, and Wisconsin.  See ALA. CODE '' 30-4-9, 43-8-72 
(West 2009); ALASKA STAT. ' 13.12.213 (West 2009); ARK. CODE ANN. '' 9-11-406, 9-11-
502 (West 2009); CAL. FAM. CODE ' 1500 (West 2009); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. ' 15-11-
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agreements either through judicial channels or through state 
legislatures.100  Although the two methods might initially appear 
separate, they are often intertwined when determining the validity of 
postnuptial agreements.101  One group of state legislatures has created 
specific statutory provisions addressing whether a postnuptial agreement 
can detail the distribution of marital property upon dissolution of a 
marriage.102  A different group of state legislatures has attempted to 
address the issue, but has failed to establish clear principles detailing 
how postnuptial agreements should be treated, thus requiring the state’s 
judicial branch to ultimately make a determination of the issue.103  Still a 
third group of state legislatures has declined to address the issue 
entirely, leaving the judiciary responsible for determining the validity of 
postnuptial agreements.104  For purposes of this comment, the discussion 
                                                                                                                 
207 (West 2009); FLA. STAT. ANN. ' 732.702 (West 2009); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
5/502 (West 2009); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. ' 403.180(1) (West 2009); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 
Ch. 209, ' 2 (West 2009); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. ' 557.23 (West 2009); MISS. CODE ANN. 
' 93-3-1 (West 2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. ' 3103.06 (West 2009); Tibbs v. Anderson, 
580 So. 2d 1337, 1339 (Ala. 1991); In re Estate of Harber, 449 P.2d 7, 12 (Ariz. 1969); 
Perkins v. Sunset Tel. & Tel. Co, 103 P. 190, 193-94 (Cal. 1909); In re Estate of Lewin, 595 
P.2d 1055, 1057 (Colo. 1979); Flansburg v. Flansburg, 581 N.E.2d 430, 433 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1991); Dunsworth v. Dunsworth, 81 P.2d 9, 12 (Kan. 1938); see Pearre v. Grossnickle, 114 
A. 725, 728 (Md. 1921); Lipic v. Lipic, 103 S.W.3d 144, 149 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003); 
Bronfman v. Bronfman, 229 A.D.2d 314, 315 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996); Keith v. Keith, 156 
N.W. 910, 911 (S.D. 1916); Bratton v. Bratton, 136 S.W.3d 595 (Tenn. 2004); Pierce v. 
Pierce, 994 P.2d 193, 198 (Utah 2000); Button v. Button, 388 N.W.2d 546, 550 (Wis. 1986). 
100.  For example, Ohio and Illinois have dealt with this problem through legislative 
channels, whereas Arizona, Kansas, and Maryland have used judicial channels to resolve the 
problem. See id. 
101.  Each of the following states has statutes and case law that help resolve the issue: 
Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Kentucky, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, and Mississippi. See ALA. CODE '' 30-4-9, 43-8-72; ALASKA STAT. ' 13.12.213; 
ARK. CODE ANN. '' 9-11-406, 9-11-502; CAL. FAM. CODE ' 1500; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. ' 
15-11-207; FLA. STAT. ANN. ' 732.702); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. ' 403.180(1); MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. Ch. 209, ' 2; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. ' 557.23; MISS. CODE ANN. ' 93-3-1; 
Tibbs, 580 So. 2d at 1339; Perkins, 103 P. at 193-94; In re Estate of Lewin, 595 P.2d at 
1057. 
102.  See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/502; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. ' 3103.06.  
103. See Tibbs, 580 So. 2d at 1339 (using ALA. CODE ' 43-8-72 as support for the 
proposition that postnuptial agreements are valid under Alabama law); In re Estate of Lewin, 
595 P.2d at 1057 (relying on COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. ' 15-11-204 to support the conclusion 
that spouses can enter into postnuptial agreements). 
104.  In re Estate of Harber, 449 P.2d at 15-16 (holding spouses have the right to 
contract with each other regarding property through a postnuptial agreement); Matlock v. 
Matlock, 576 P.2d 629, 633 (Kan. 1978) (holding that spouses can use a postnuptial 
agreement to determine property rights between each other); Pearre, 114 A. at 728  
(justifying the validity of postnuptial agreement by finding that women can waive their right 
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of states that have addressed the validity of postnuptial agreements are 
divided into three categories: (1) states with a statute clearly on point, 
(2) states relying on a judicial interpretation of a state statute, and (3) 
states dependent solely on judicial determination. 
1. State Statute Clearly On Point 
Several states have explicitly addressed the validity of postnuptial 
agreements through enactment of statutes, eliminating the need for 
judicial interpretation to clarify the intent of such statutes.105  The 
unambiguous language of these statutes results in little need to litigate 
issues surrounding such statutes, thereby effectively precluding any case 
law on the subject.106 
Ohio serves as an example of a state that has a statute with 
unambiguous language.107  Ohio’s statute reads: “A husband and wife 
cannot, by any contract with each other, alter their legal relations . . . 
.”108  Because of the clear language of this statute, very few cases even 
address the validity of postnuptial agreements in Ohio, and in the few 
instances where the issue has come before an Ohio court, the courts have 
simply held that postnuptial agreements violate Ohio statutory law and 
are therefore invalid.109  The Ohio cases do not offer any analysis or 
reasoning of the legislature’s intent to hold postnuptial agreements 
invalid.110  Further, there is no legislative history available to explain 
why the legislature chose to ban postnuptial agreements under Ohio law. 
Illinois is another state that has a statute with unambiguous language; 
however, unlike Ohio, Illinois permits postnuptial agreements.111  The 
relevant Illinois statute states: “[T]o promote amicable settlement of 
disputes between parties to a marriage attendant upon the dissolution of 
their marriage, the parties may enter into a written or oral agreement 
                                                                                                                 
to dower pre- or postnuptially). 
105.  750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/502; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. ' 3103.06.  
106.  The only cases dealing with postnuptial agreements that have come before Illinois 
courts involve factual issues of the postnuptial agreement. See Marriage of Richardson, 606 
N.E.2d 56 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992); Matter of Estate of Brosseau, 531 N.E.2d 158 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1988). Ohio courts have clearly held postnuptial agreements invalid as violating Ohio’s 
statutory law. See Brewsaugh v. Brewsaugh, 491 N.E.2d 748, 750 (1985). 
107.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. ' 3103.06. 
108.  Id. 
109.  Brewsaugh, 491 N.E.2d at 750; see Hoffman v. Dobbins, 2009 WL 3119635 (Ohio. 
App. 2009); Howard v. Howard, 1989 WL 109745 (Ohio App. 1989); Burgin v. Burgin, 
1987 WL 15090 (Ohio App. 1987). 
110.  See Brewsaugh, 491 N.E.2d 748.  
111.  750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/502 (West 2009). 
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containing provisions for disposition of any property owned . . . .”112  
Again, there are no judicial opinions that support or offer analysis as to 
why the legislature intended to recognize postnuptial agreements.113 
2. State Statute Plus Judicial Interpretation 
Some states legislatures appear to have attempted to address 
postnuptial agreements through statutes,114 but judicial interpretation of 
those statutes is necessary to truly determine whether postnuptial 
agreements can be valid.  These state judiciaries have interpreted 
primarily two types of statutes.  The first type of statute includes 
language allowing a specific property right, such as a right to homestead 
allowance, to be waived or altered through either a pre- or postnuptial 
agreement.115  The other type of statute allows husbands and wives to 
enter into transactions with each other regarding their respective 
property rights.116  
a) Ability to Alter or Waive Specific Property Rights 
Statutes that provide for the alteration or waiver of specific property 
rights have typically been interpreted to permit spouses to pre- or 
postnuptially agree to change any of their property rights, not just the 
rights stated in the statute.117  Judicial branches that have addressed 
postnuptial agreements this way have effectively extended the ability to 
                                                                                                                 
112.  Id. 
113. Cases have come before Illinois courts, however, as inquiries into whether a specific 
postnuptial agreement is valid are based upon the specific factual situation. See, e.g., 
Marriage of Richardson, 606 N.E.2d 56 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992); Matter of Estate of Brosseau, 
531 N.E.2d 158 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988). 
114. See ALA. CODE '' 30-4-9, 43-8-72 (West 2009); ALASKA STAT. ' 13.12.213 (West 
2009); ARK. CODE ANN. '' 9-11-406, 9-11-502 (West 2009); CAL. FAM. CODE ' 1500 (West 
2009); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. ' 15-11-207 (West 2009); FLA. STAT. ANN. ' 732.702 (West 
2009); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. ' 403.180(1) (West 2009); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 209, ' 2 
(West 2009); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. ' 557.23 (West 2009); MISS. CODE ANN. ' 93-3-1 
(West 2009). 
115. See ALA. CODE ' 43-8-72; ALASKA STAT. ' 13.12.213; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. '' 
15-11-204, 15-11-207; FLA. STAT. ANN. ' 732.702. 
116. See ALA. CODE ' 30-4-9; ARK. CODE ANN. ' 9-11-502; CAL. FAM. CODE ' 1500; 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. ' 403.180(1); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 209, ' 2; MICH. COMP. 
LAWS ANN. ' 557.23; MISS. CODE ANN. ' 93-3-1. 
117. See Tibbs v. Anderson, 580 So.2d 1337, 1339 (Ala. 1991) (using ALA. CODE ' 43-8-
72 (West 2009) as support for the proposition that postnuptial agreements are valid under 
Alabama law); In re Estate of Lewin, 595 P.2d 1055, 1057 (Colo. 1979) (relying on COLO. 
REV. STAT. ANN. ' 15-11-204 as supporting the conclusion that spouses can enter into 
postnuptial agreements).  
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pre- or postnuptially agree to alter or waive rights that are beyond those 
specifically enumerated within the statutory language without offering 
any analysis as to why these statutes support this conclusion. 
For example, in Tibbs v. Anderson, the Alabama Supreme Court made 
a clear and simple statement: “[W]e note that . . . postnuptial agreements 
are valid in Alabama.”118  To support this proposition, the court cited an 
Alabama statute allowing spouses to postnuptially waive a specific 
property right.119  Although the Alabama Supreme Court did not provide 
any reasoning why this statute supported allowing spouses to 
postnuptially waive other property rights, one can speculate that the 
court made the decision in light of society’s changing views of women, 
specifically the acceptance of the view that women are equal with men.  
Like the Alabama Supreme Court, other state judicial branches have 
interpreted statutes to support the conclusion that postnuptial 
agreements can be valid without providing additional support as to why 
such statutes allow spouses to postnuptially modify any property right. 
b) Ability of Spouses to Enter Into Contracts 
The second type of statute that arguably covers postnuptial 
agreements is one which allows spouses to enter into transactions with 
each other regarding their respective property rights.  As an example, 
Oklahoma’s statute reads: “Either husband or wife may enter into any 
engagement or transaction with the other, . . . respecting property . . . 
.”120  An important distinction must be noted because a simple 
transaction between a husband and wife dealing with property rights 
might not be the same thing as a pre- or postnuptial agreement, 
depending upon the jurisdiction.121  When spouses agree to contract with 
each other regarding property rights, their respective property rights are 
affected upon the signature of the property transaction.  For example, 
suppose Bob and Laura agree to a transaction which specifies that upon 
the completion of the immediate transaction, Laura will gain sole 
ownership of their home, and in exchange Bob will receive all 
ownership rights in stock once jointly owned by the spouses.  In this 
                                                                                                                 
118.  Tibbs, 580 So.2d at 1339. 
119.  Id. 
120.  43 OKLA. STAT. ' 204 (2001). Similar statutes include ARK. CODE ANN. '' 9-11-
406, 9-11-502; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. ' 403.180(1); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209, ' 2. 
121.  See Hendrick v. Hendrick, 1999 OK CIV APP 15, & 13, 976 P.2d 1071, 1073 
(discussing that when a spouse conveys to another an interest in marital property prior to 
dissolution of the marriage, such property is removed from the marital estate; thus, the 
transaction affects property interests before a pre- or postnuptial agreement would). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2011
798 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:779 
 
 
example, the property rights of the spouses are affected upon the 
completion (normally the signature) of the transaction. 
By contrast, the unique feature of a pre- or postnuptial agreement is 
that the parties’ property rights are not affected until dissolution of the 
marriage.122  Thus, at the time a postnuptial agreement is signed, a 
spouse’s individual property rights have not been affected C only rights 
of expected interests in property have been affected.123  Use of another 
example will help clarify this point.  Suppose Ginny and Joe enter into a 
postnuptial agreement which states that upon the dissolution of 
marriage, Ginny will receive all interest in their home property, and Joe 
will receive all interest in any investment real-estate property held.  
Under this example, neither Joe’s rights in their home property, nor 
Ginny’s rights in the investment real-estate property will be affected 
until the dissolution of their marriage.  Thus, Ginny and Joe have altered 
their prospective property rights. 
The Kentucky Supreme Court provides an example of typical judicial 
analysis of these statutes.124  The Kentucky legislature enacted a statute 
allowing spouses to enter into agreements that detail how property will 
be distributed upon dissolution of marriage.125  In Edwardson v. 
Edwardson, the Kentucky Supreme court relied on this statute to support 
the conclusion that postnuptial agreements can be valid.126  
Unfortunately, the court offered no analysis explaining why this statute 
specifically supported the conclusion that postnuptial agreements can be 
valid; it almost appeared as though the court felt it was obvious due to 
its lack of analysis.127  State judiciaries that have interpreted statutes 
similar to Kentucky’s statute cited above have effectively held that 
spouses can not only enter into transactions that affect their property 
rights upon completion of the transaction, but spouses can also enter 
into transactions that affect their prospective property rights. 
  
                                                                                                                 
122.  Hendrick, 1999 OK CIV APP 15, & 13, 976 P.2d 1071, 1073 
123.  See In re Blaydes’ Estate, 202 OK 558, 216 P.2d 277, 280 (discussing that a spouse 
does not have any actual property rights C only expectation of future property rights C in the 
other spouse’s property until death or divorce). 
124.  Edwardson v. Edwardson, 798 S.W.2d 941 (Ky. S. Ct. 1990). 
125.  KY. REV. STAT. ANN. ' 403.180(1).  
126.  Edwardson, 798 S.W.2d at 945-46 n.2. 
127.  See id.  
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3. Judicial Precedent Standing Alone 
Several states that have addressed the validity of postnuptial 
agreements have done so based solely on common law principles, 
supporting such holdings on freedom of contract theories.128  According 
to these states, postnuptial agreements are simply contracts.129  
Accordingly, any contract can be valid provided that certain 
requirements are met.  Specifically, the contract must be fair, just and 
equitable, and free from fraud, overreaching, or misrepresentation.130  
These requirements are not unique to postnuptial agreements but are 
common to all traditional contracts.131 
In In Re Estate of Harber, the Arizona Supreme Court was faced with 
a question of first impression: whether a postnuptial agreement can be 
valid.132  The court began its analysis by stating that although Arizona 
had a statute addressing how prenuptial agreements were to be treated, 
this statute was not applicable to postnuptial agreements.133  The court 
continued by discussing at great length the legal development and 
treatment of women’s status by noting that through statutory and 
common law recognition, a woman is an independent individual and has 
all the same rights to manage her affairs that are enjoyed by men.134  
Reaching its final determination, the court stated that due to the “equal 
status of women [and] men under the law,” spouses are to enjoy all 
rights to contract with each other regarding property rights, both 
                                                                                                                 
128.  Arizona, Kansas, and Maryland are states that rely solely on common-law 
principles to control postnuptial validity. re Estate of Harber, 449 P.2d 7, 12 (Ariz. 1969); 
Dunsworth v. Dunsworth, 81 P.2d 9, 12 (Kan. 1938); see Pearre v. Grossnickle, 114 A. 725, 
728 (Md. 1921). 
129.  In re Estate of Harber, 449 P.2d at 12; Dunsworth, 81 P.2d at 12; see Pearre, 114 
A. at 728. 
130.  In re Estate of Harber, 449 P.2d at 15 (holding that postnuptial agreements that 
distribute property rights currently or prospectively can be valid conditioned upon meeting 
special safeguards); Dunsworth, 81 P.2d at 12 (finding that a postnuptial agreement can be 
valid as long as certain requirements are met); see Pearre, 114 A. at 728; see also Perkins v. 
Sunset Tel. & Tel. Co, 103 P. 190, 193-94 (Cal. 1909) (holding that spouses could contract 
with respect to property rights currently held or in expectancy, which was later codified in 
CAL. FAM. CODE ' 1500 (West 2009). 
131.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACT ' 164 (1981) (recognizing that a 
misrepresentation can make a contract voidable); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACT ' 
177 (1981) (holding that undue influence can make a contract voidable); U.C.C. ' 2-302 
(allowing courts the discretion to enforce unconscionable terms or provisions of a contract). 
132.  In re Estate of Harber, 449 P.2d at 14. 
133.  Id.; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. ' 25-201 (2009) (defining a prenuptial agreement). 
134.  In re Estate of Harber, 449 P.2d at 14. 
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presently and anticipated.135  The court additionally supported its 
determination when it noted that spouses already enjoyed the right to 
convey interests in property that were otherwise considered community 
property, thus taking such property outside the marital estate.136  Thus, 
two factors ultimately guided the court to conclude that postnuptial 
agreements could be valid: (1) the legal development of women’s status, 
and (2) the existence of other contractual rights shared between spouses 
prior to this case. 
The California Supreme Court also addressed the validity of 
postnuptial agreements in Perkins v. Sunset Telephone & Telegraph 
Company.137  The court reached the conclusion that spouses can 
determine their property rights upon dissolution of marriage through 
contract, either pre- or postnuptially.138   In reaching its determination, 
the court stated: “[T]he utmost freedom of contract exists in California 
between husband and wife.”139  Thus, the court relied upon the theory of 
freedom to contract as justification that spouses have the ability to enter 
into postnuptial agreements under California law. 
 IV. Treatment of Postnuptial Agreements Under Oklahoma Law 
A. Oklahoma Statutory Implications 
Two different Oklahoma Courts of Civil Appeal have addressed 
whether postnuptial agreements can be valid under Oklahoma law, each 
providing a very different answer.140  Both courts based their decision 
principally on interpretations of two different Oklahoma statutes they 
felt addressed and resolved the problem.141  The two statutes discussed 
in the appellate court opinions are title 43, sections 204 (transactions 
between spouses statute) and 121 (division of property statute).  In 
addition to these two Oklahoma appellate court decisions, the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court addressed postnuptial validity when it interpreted title 
                                                                                                                 
135.  Id. at 15. 
136.  Id. 
137.  Perkins v. Sunset Tel. & Tel. Co, 103 P. 190, 193 (Cal. 1909). 
138.  Id. at 193-94. 
139.  Id. at 194. 
140.  See Hendrick v. Hendrick, 1999 OK CIV APP 15, 976 P.2d 1071; Boyer v. Boyer, 
1996 OK CIV APP 94, 925 P.2d 82. 
141.  See Hendrick, 1999 OK CIV APP 15, 976 P.2d 1071 (Okla. Civ. App. Div. 1 1998) 
(interpreting 43 OKLA. STAT. '' 121, 204); Boyer, 1996 OK CIV APP 94, 925 P.2d 82  
(interpreting 43 OKLA. STAT. ' 204). 
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84, section 44,142 and when it interpreted what is now title 43, section 
203.143  The cases interpreting title 43, sections 204 and 121, and title 
84, section 44 provide guidance to postnuptial validity, however, the 
issue will be answered primarily based upon the language of the three 
statutes. 
1. Transactions Between Spouses Statute 
Oklahoma’s transaction between spouses statute is of particular 
importance to the validity of postnuptial agreements, and reads as 
follows: 
Either husband or wife may enter into any engagement or 
transaction with the other, or with any other person, 
respecting property, which either might, if unmarried, subject, 
in transactions between themselves, to the general rules which 
control the action of persons occupying confidential relations 
with each other as defined by the title on trust.144  
On its face, this statute appears to give married couples the ability to 
enter into transactions with each other respecting property C including 
marital property.145  This interpretation of the statute, however, is not 
without dispute.146  An alternative interpretation of this statute only 
allows spouses to contract to affect presentlyBheld interests in property 
and not prospective interests contingent upon death or divorce.147 
2. Division of Property Upon Divorce 
Oklahoma’s division of property statute describes how marital 
property will be distributed upon divorce.  The language of the statute 
reads as follows: 
The court shall enter its decree confirming in each spouse the 
property owned by him or her before marriage and the 
undisposed-of property acquired after marriage by him or her 
                                                                                                                 
142. See Atkinson v. Barr, 1967 OK 103, 428 P.2d 316 (Okla. 1967) (interpreting 84 
OKLA. STAT. ' 44). 
143. See Crane v. Howard, 1951 OK 282, 243 P.2d 998 (Okla. 1951) (holding 
postnuptial agreements cannot affect the forced heir statute). 
144. 43 OKLA. STAT. ' 204 (2001).  It is worth noting that the statute explicitly holds that 
spouses are in a confidential relationship, similar to a fiduciary relationship, when entering 
contracts regarding property. 
145.  Id.; see Boyer, 1996 OK CIV APP 94, 925 P.2d 82. 
146.  See Hendrick, 1999 OK CIV APP 15, 976 P.2d 1071. 
147.  Id. at & 12, 976 P.2d at 1073. 
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in his or her own right . . . .  As to such property, whether real 
or personal, which has been acquired by the parties jointly 
during their marriage, whether the title thereto be in either or 
both of said parties, the court shall, subject to a valid 
antenuptial contract in writing, make such division between 
the parties as may appear just and reasonable . . . .148 
Thus, the statute grants each party to the dissolved marriage the 
ability to retain property that was acquired by them before marriage, as 
well as property acquired solely by them after marriage.149  Further, the 
statute authorizes courts to divide jointly-acquired property between the 
parties as it deems just and reasonable.150  The statute, however, places a 
limitation on a court’s ability to divide joint property C such power is 
subject to a valid prenuptial agreement.151  In the case of divorce, a 
prenuptial agreement governs the distribution of marital property.152 
3. Oklahoma Forced Heir Statute 
Oklahoma’s Forced Heir Statute controls how a decedent’s property 
is distributed upon his death.  The statute reads: 
 Every estate in property may be disposed of by will; provided 
however, that a will shall be subservient to any antenuptial 
marriage contract in writing; but no spouse shall bequeath or 
devise away from the other so much of the estate of the 
testator that the other spouse would receive less in value than 
would be obtained through succession by law . . . .153 
The statute allows an individual to choose to dispose of his property 
through a will as opposed to intestate succession.154  If an individual 
chooses to control the distribution of his property through a will, the 
statute, however, places a limitation on the individual’s ability to control 
the distribution of his estate.155  If the individual has a spouse, then he 
                                                                                                                 
148. 43 OKLA. STAT. ' 121 (Supp. 2007).  An antenuptial agreement is the same thing as 
a prenuptial agreement. 
149.  See id. 
150.  See id. 
151.  See id. 
152.  See id. 
153.  84 OKLA. STAT. ' 44 (2001). 
154.  See id.; 84 OKLA. STAT. ' 213 (2001) is Oklahoma’s intestate succession statute. 
155.  See 84 OKLA. STAT. ' 44. 
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cannot, by will, provide that his spouse receive less than one-half of the 
value of joint-industry property.156 
The statute also requires that a prenuptial agreement control over a 
valid will or distribution through intestate succession.157  Additionally, 
the limitation placed on an individual’s ability to control the distribution 
of his property through a will C not being able to leave his spouse an 
interest in his estate that would be less than one-half the value of joint-
industry property C is not placed on the individual when he chooses to 
use a prenuptial agreement as the means to distribute his property.158  
Thus, it appears that the statute gives an individual greater rights to 
control his estate if a prenuptial agreement is used. 
B. Oklahoma Supreme Court Guidance 
1. The Interplay Between the Oklahoma Statutes 
Determining how the different statutes relate to each other is where 
Oklahoma courts have been in conflict.  In Hendrick v. Hendrick, an 
Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals held that Oklahoma’s division of 
property statute controls when determining whether a postnuptial 
agreement can be valid, and such statute mandates that a court determine 
the division of property upon dissolution of a marriage, subject only to a 
prenuptial agreement.159  Hendrick also held that title 43, section 204, 
governing transactions between spouses, is not relevant to the analysis 
when determining whether a postnuptial agreement can be valid.160  In 
Boyer v. Boyer, a decision by a different Oklahoma Court of Civil 
Appeals, the court held that title 43, section 204 was relevant to 
postnuptial validity and allowed spouses to affect their property rights 
through a postnuptial agreement.161 
Along with the two Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals cases, there are 
some Oklahoma Supreme Court cases that addressed the validity of 
postnuptial agreements in the very limited context of the forced heir 
statute.162  This section will begin with a discussion of the Oklahoma 
                                                                                                                 
156.  See id. 
157.  See 84 OKLA. STAT. ' 44. 
158.  See id.; BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 4, at 176, 517  (9th ed. 2009); Talley 
v. Harris, 1947 OK 218, &9, 182 P.2d 765, 768 (Okla. 1947) (holding the limitation clause 
of title 84, section 213 applies only to the “every estate in property to be disposed of by will” 
clause and not the prenuptial clause). 
159.  See Hendrick v. Hendrick, 1999 OK CIV APP 15, 976 P.2d 1071. 
160.  See id. 
161.  See Boyer v. Boyer, 1996 OK CIV APP 94, 925 P.2d 82. 
162.  See Atkinson v. Barr, 1967 OK 103, 428 P.2d 316 (Okla. 1967); Crane v. Howard, 
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Supreme Court’s decision in Atkinson v. Barr, as it is the most recent 
representative case, and will then address the two appellate court 
decisions in chronological order. 
2. The Decision of Atkinson v. Barr 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court addressed the validity of postnuptial 
agreements in a limited context approximately thirty years prior to 
Boyer and Hendrick.  In Atkinson, the Oklahoma Supreme Court 
addressed whether spouses could postnuptially waive their rights under 
Oklahoma’s forced heir statute.163  This case involved a deed between a 
husband and wife relating to homestead property.164  A few years after 
marriage, the husband and wife separated for a short period, and during 
this separation period the husband purported to convey his interest in the 
couple’s homestead property to his wife by quit-claim deed.165  The 
court determined that through the quit-claim deed, the husband had 
conveyed any and all rights he had in the homestead property to his 
wife.166 
Ultimately, the separation period lasted only six weeks, and the 
couple resumed living together in their homestead property for 
approximately another year and a half before the wife died.167  After the 
wife died intestate, the husband continued to live in the property until 
his death.168  The quit-claim deed executed by the husband, during the 
separation period, came into question after he died and his executor 
began to probate his will.169  The wife’s statutory heirs claimed that 
when the husband executed the quit-claim deed he not only gave up his 
current interest in the homestead property but also his right to a share of 
                                                                                                                 
1951 OK 282, 243 P.2d 998 (Okla. 1951); In re Blayde’s Estate, 1950 OK 73, 216 P.2d 277 
(Okla. 1950). 
163.  Id.  84 OKLA. STAT. ' 44 (2001) is also known as “forced heir statute.”  The forced 
heir statute basically holds that a spouse cannot by will or prenuptial agreement leave their 
spouse an amount of their estate that would be less than one-half of the value of property 
obtained through joint industry. 
164.  Atkinson, & 6, 428 P.2d at 318. 
165.  Id.  A quit-claim deed purports to convey any and all interest that one individual 
currently holds in property to the recipient of the quit-claim deed, without warranty title. 
166.  Id. & 23, 428 P.2d at 320 
167. See id. & 6, 428 P.2d at 318.  The six-week separation period began in August of 
1949 and the wife died in April of 1951. Thus, the couple lived in the homestead property 
post-separation for approximately a year and a half. 
168.  Id. && 6-8, 428 P.2d at 318. 
169.  Id. && 8-9, 428 P.2d at 318. 
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the property through intestate succession.170  The executor of the 
husband’s estate claimed the quit-claim deed could not deprive the 
husband of his statutory right of inheritance from his wife through the 
forced heir statute.171 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court was forced to determine whether the 
husband had conveyed away his statutory right of inheritance in the 
couple’s homestead property by the quit-claim deed.172  In this situation, 
the wife’s heirs claimed the quit-claim deed essentially functioned as a 
postnuptial agreement attempting to waive the husband’s inheritance 
rights, through the forced heir statute, in the homestead property.173  The 
Oklahoma Supreme Court ultimately concluded that despite the quit-
claim deed, the husband could not waive his statutory right to an interest 
in his homestead property through a postnuptial agreement.174 
According to Oklahoma’s statute of descent and distribution 
applicable at the time, a spouse was entitled to a one-third interest in 
homestead property if the decedent left more than one child or heir.175  
In this case, the Oklahoma Supreme Court concluded that when the wife 
died intestate leaving two children, her husband was entitled to a one-
third interest in their homestead property, and the husband could not 
postnuptially agree to waive this interest in the property.176  The court 
held that Oklahoma’s forced heir statute forbid the husband from 
waiving his statutory interest in the homestead property through a 
postnuptial agreement.177  At the time, this statute read: 
Every estate in property may be disposed of by will; provided 
however, that a will shall be subservient to any [prenuptial] 
marriage contract in writing; but no spouse shall bequeath or 
devise away from the other so much of the estate of the 
testator that the other spouse would receive less in value than 
would be obtained through succession by law. . . .178 
In conclusion, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held title 84, section 44 
prohibited a spouse from waiving his statutory right of inheritance 
                                                                                                                 
170.  Id. && 6-9, 428 P.2d at 318. 
171.  Id. & 11, 428 P.2d at 319. 
172.  See Atkinson, 1967 OK 103, 428 P.2d 316. 
173.  Id. & 23, 428 P.2d at 320. 
174.  Id. & 29, 428 P.2d at 320-21. 
175.  84 OKLA. STAT. ' 213 (2001). 
176.  Atkinson, & 29, 428 P.2d at 320-21. 
177.  Id. (interpreting 84 OKLA. STAT. ' 44). 
178.  84 OKLA. STAT. ' 44. 
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through a postnuptial agreement;179 however, the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court did not go so far as to say that all postnuptial agreements are per 
se invalid.  From the facts of Atkinson, the court’s decision appears 
controlling in situations where spouses try to use a postnuptial 
agreement to create a marital agreement independent of a prenuptial 
agreement.  It is uncertain, however, if this case is controlling in 
situations where spouses try to use a postnuptial agreement to simply 
modify an existent prenuptial agreement.  
C. The Boyer v. Boyer Analysis 
In Boyer v. Boyer, the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals was faced 
with the issue of whether a valid prenuptial agreement could be 
modified during marriage by use of a postnuptial agreement.180  In 
September 1989, Glenn and Judy Boyer were married.181  Before their 
marriage, the couple entered into a valid prenuptial agreement which 
stated that each party would retain sole possession of property owned 
prior to marriage and “any increase in value of the separate property 
would remain separate.”182  In 1991, the couple wanted to make 
improvements to one of the wife’s separate pieces of real-estate using 
the husband’s funds.183  The couple attempted to modify their prenuptial 
agreement to reflect the husband’s investment in the wife’s property, 
which would give the husband a proportionate interest in the property 
that reflected his investment.184  Eventually the coupled filed for divorce 
in December 1994, and the wife challenged the validity of the 
postnuptial modification to the prenuptial agreement.185 
The Boyer court began its analysis of the validity of postnuptial 
agreements by discussing title 43, section 204, governing transactions 
between spouses.186  In discussing the statute, the Boyer court called 
upon an Oklahoma Supreme Court case, Manhart v. Manhart, that 
analyzed the same statute.187  The Boyer court noted the Oklahoma 
                                                                                                                 
179.  Atkinson, & 29, 428 P.2d at 320-21 (citing Crane v. Howard, 1951 OK 282, 243 
P.2d 998). 
180.  Boyer v. Boyer, 1996 OK CIV APP 94, & 9, 925 P.2d 82, 84. 
181.  Id. & 2, 925 P.2d at 83. 
182.  Id. 
183.  Id. & 3, 925 P.2d at 83. 
184.  Id. 
185.  Id. && 4-6, 925 P.2d at 83. 
186.  Id. & 10, 925 P.2d at 84. 
187.  Id. & 11, 925 P.2d at 84 (citing Manhart v. Manhart, 1986 OK 12, 725 P.2d 1234 
(Okla. 1986)). 
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Supreme Court stated “that spouses may contract with each other and 
alter their legal relations as to property” and that spouses may alter their 
marital relations regarding property by either conveying a property 
interest to the other or by taking joint property out of the marital estate 
that would otherwise be subject to equitable division.188  The Boyer 
court further clarified that the ability of spouses to contract with each 
other was limited by statute to contracts affecting property rights 
only.189 
To support its position that postnuptial agreements are valid under 
Oklahoma law, the Boyer court provided an additional theory based on 
contract principles.190  The court stated that Oklahoma clearly 
recognized that a contract may be modified by mutual consent and 
consideration; thus, basic contract law permitted a prenuptial agreement 
C a form of a contract C to be modified through a postnuptial 
agreement.191  Additionally, the court supported the contract theory by 
stating that because a prenuptial agreement can be rescinded or revoked, 
it followed that a prenuptial agreement could also be modified 
postnuptially.192  The contract theory based analysis, however, appeared 
to be limited to specific factual situations.  It seemed as if the analysis 
pertained to factual situations where spouses wanted to modify an 
existing prenuptial agreement through a postnuptial agreement, as 
opposed to situations where a postnuptial agreement is the first marital 
agreement between a couple. 
The court ultimately concluded its analysis by holding that 
postnuptial agreements can be valid and then imposed certain 
requirements in order for a postnuptial agreement to be valid: (1) the 
agreement is fairly entered into, (2) the intentions of the parties are 
clear, (3) the agreement is substantively fair, and (4) the agreement 
“does not contravene public policy.”193   
D. Postnuptial Treatment Under Hendrick v. Hendrick 
Two years later, in Hendrick, a different Oklahoma Court of Civil 
Appeals considered the validity of postnuptial agreements.194  The 
                                                                                                                 
188.  Id. & 11, 925 P.2d at 84 (citing Manhart v. Manhart, 1986 OK 12, 725 P.2d 1234 
(Okla. 1986)). 
189.  Id. & 11 n.3, 925 P.2d at 84 n.3; see 43 OKLA. STAT. ' 205 (2001)). 
190.  Id. & 14, 925 P.2d at 85. 
191.  Id. 
192.  Id. & 15, 925 P.2d at 85. 
193.  Id. 
194.  Hendrick v. Hendrick, 1999 OK CIV APP 15, & 2, 976 P.2d 1071. 
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parties in this case were married in 1985 and entered into a prenuptial 
agreement before marriage.195  Under the prenuptial agreement, the wife 
waived any and all rights to the real and personal property of the 
husband to which she might otherwise be entitled.196  The prenuptial 
agreement provided that after five years of marriage, the wife would be 
entitled to receive property worth $1,000,000 from the husband in the 
event of divorce.197  In 1989, the husband made gifts to his wife with a 
value of approximately $5,000,000.198  The couple then entered into two 
different postnuptial agreements modifying the prenuptial agreement: 
the first postnuptial agreement stated that the gifts alleviated any 
liability the husband might have in the case of divorce under the original 
prenuptial agreement, and the second postnuptial agreement stated that 
the wife would have to give back any of the gifts that exceeded 
$1,000,000 in value in the event of divorce.199  In 1995, the wife filed 
for divorce and challenged the validity of the postnuptial agreements.200 
The court started its analysis of postnuptial agreements by stating that 
marriage is a statutory creature and “each spouse has a statutory share in 
the marital estate in the event of divorce.”201  Thus, the only way to 
affect these rights is through a statute.202  The court then reiterated that 
the language of Oklahoma’s division of property statute states that an 
equitable division of marital property is subject to only one thing C a 
valid prenuptial agreement,203 and stated that by its very nature a 
prenuptial agreement is one entered into before marriage.204  Thus, a 
modification of a prenuptial agreement changes the very nature of the 
agreement, and it is no longer a prenuptial agreement, but a postnuptial 
agreement.205 
The court then addressed whether title 43, section 204 supported 
postnuptial agreement validity.206  The court held that the language of 
the statue allowed one spouse to gift or convey to the other spouse his 
                                                                                                                 
195.  Id. at 1071. 
196.  Id. 
197.  Id. & 2, 976 P.2d at 1071-72. 
198.  Id. & 3, 976 P.2d at 1072. 
199.  Id. && 4-5, 976 P.2d at 1072. 
200.  Id. & 6, 976 P.2d at 1072. 
201.  Id. & 9, 976 P.2d at 1072. 
202.  Id. 
203.  Id. & 12, 976 P.2d at 1073. 
204.  Id. & 11, 976 P.2d at 1072-73. 
205.  Id. 
206.  Id. & 12, 976 P.2d at 1073. 
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interest in marital property, which would have the effect of taking the 
property out of the marital estate.207  The effects of a section 204 
conveyance are distinguishable from the effects of a postnuptial 
agreement because a postnuptial agreement “is only effective upon the 
contingency of divorce and/or death,” whereas a section 204 conveyance 
is effective immediately.208  Therefore, a postnuptial agreement affects 
the marital estate only upon the contingency of one of those events, and 
section 204 does not support this kind of alteration to spousal property 
rights.209 
The court continued its discussion of Boyer and provided further 
analysis of why the Boyer court erroneously found postnuptial 
agreements valid.210  In addition to the section 204 discussion, the 
Hendrick court stated that Boyer interpreted the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court’s decision in Manhart incorrectly.211  The Manhart case did not 
deal with a prenuptial or postnuptial agreement, but instead dealt with a 
section 204 transaction of property between spouses, which took the 
property out of the marital estate.212  The Hendrick analysis of the 
difference in a postnuptial agreement and a section 204 transaction 
explains why the Hendrick court held Manhart did not support the 
validity of postnuptial agreements, as Boyer held it did. 
The court also addressed Boyer’s proposition that contract law allows 
prenuptial agreements to be modified through a postnuptial agreement.  
The Hendrick court stated that the proposition that a prenuptial 
agreement could be postnuptially modified simply because a prenuptial 
agreement could be rescinded “is [simply] a legal non sequitur.”213  But 
the court did not provide any further analysis to support that contract 
law was not applicable to the situation.214   Thus, all of the above 
reasons led the Hendrick court to hold that postnuptial agreements 
(either through modifying an earlier marital agreement or starting new) 
are not valid.215 
                                                                                                                 
207.  Id.  
208.  Id. 
209.  Id. 
210.  Id. & 13, 976 P.2d at 1073. 
211.  Id. 
212.  Id. 
213.  Id. & 14, 976 P.2d at 1073.  A legal non sequitur means an inference or conclusion 
that does not logically follow from the premise. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 4, at 
1157 (9th ed. 2009). 
214.  Hendrick, & 14, 976 P.2d at 1073. 
215.  Id. & 17, 976 P.2d at 1074. 
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 V. The Applicability of Oklahoma Statutes to Postnuptial Agreement 
Validity 
Essential to addressing postnuptial agreement validity in Oklahoma is 
determining which Oklahoma statutes are relevant to the issue and in 
what situations.  All three statutes, title 43, sections 121 and 204 and 
title 84, section 44, seem to play a role in determining postnuptial 
agreement validity.  This section will begin by addressing the 
relationship of the three Oklahoma statutes.  Next, in addition to 
addressing to what extent each respective Oklahoma statute pertains to 
the issue, this section will suggest that the effects of the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court’s decision in Atkinson will guide the determination of 
whether postnuptial agreements are valid.  This section concludes with a 
suggested change to Oklahoma’s statutory scheme in order to allow 
postnuptial agreements to be valid in all situations, which is in line with 
Oklahoma’s policy of favoring marital agreements in general. 
A. Postnuptial Agreement Validity Under Oklahoma’s Current Statutory 
Scheme 
1. Relationship of Oklahoma’s Three Postnuptial Agreement Statutes 
Title 43, section 204, Oklahoma’s spousal statute, contains the 
broadest language of the three Oklahoma statutes relevant to postnuptial 
validity;216 thus, this is the best statute to begin the discussion of the 
relationship of the three.  This statute gives spouses the general ability 
to enter into transactions with each other in whatever forms those 
transactions may take.217  Section 204 also gives spouses the ability to 
enter into marital contracts respecting property generally.218  Whether 
the agreement is prenuptial in nature, or an agreement to convey 
interests in marital property, section 204 is what allows this type of 
transaction.219 
Unlike the Boyer court holding, section 204 should not guide a 
court’s determination when addressing postnuptial agreement validity.  
Boyer incorrectly relied on section 204 to support its holding that a 
prenuptial agreement could be modified through a postnuptial 
agreement.220  Although some states have relied on statutes with 
                                                                                                                 
216.  See 43 OKLA. STAT. ' 204 (2001). 
217.  See id. 
218.  See id. 
219.  See id. 
220.  Boyer v. Boyer, 1996 OK CIV APP 94, 925 P.2d 82. 
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language similar to section 204, those states do not have any other 
statutes that are more pertinent to postnuptial validity.221  While it may 
be appropriate to use section 204 as a starting point when discussing 
postnuptial agreement validity, exclusive reliance on this statute is 
improper because Oklahoma maintains statutes that are more germane to 
postnuptial validity.222  Thus, these other statutes should govern a 
court’s analysis of postnuptial validity. 
Title 43, section 121 instructs Oklahoma courts of the proper 
procedures to use when distributing property upon a divorce.223  Title 
84, section 44 serves the same function for Oklahoma courts except that 
it guides how to dispose of property upon the death of spouses.224  Since 
attempting to define property rights is the most common situation in 
which a postnuptial agreement is used, title 43, section 121 and title 84, 
section 44 are the two statutes that courts should look to when 
determining whether a postnuptial agreement can detail how property is 
supposed to be distributed.  Because these two statutes differ in 
language, it is important to look at the effects of each separately. 
Title 84, section 44 is found in the Wills and Succession section of 
Oklahoma’s statute scheme.225  The majority of this statute deals more 
with wills than it does with marital agreements, as it states that an 
individual can create a will to bypass Oklahoma’s intestate statute.226  
Further, the statute places restrictions on wills as discussed in Part 
IV.A.3 of this comment.  The second clause of subpart A of this statute, 
however, contains language that relates this statute to marital contracts, 
as it states that wills will be subject to a prenuptial agreement.227  Thus, 
when a court probates a decedent’s estate and the decedent had a 
prenuptial agreement with his spouse, the court looks to a prenuptial 
agreement to determine how the decedent’s estate is to be distributed.228  
In the event that no prenuptial agreement exists, the court then looks to 
see if the decedent had a will to guide in the distribution of his estate, 
and turns finally to Oklahoma’s intestate succession if the decedent did 
                                                                                                                 
221.  See ARK. CODE ANN. '' 9-11-406, 9-11-502 (West 2009); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 
ch. 209, ' 2 (West 2009).  Reference Part III.B.2.b. for discussion of statutes with this type 
of general language. 
222.  See 43 OKLA. STAT. ' 121 (Supp. 2007); 84 OKLA. STAT. ' 44 (2001). 
223.  43 OKLA. STAT. ' 121. 
224.  See 84 OKLA. STAT. ' 44. 
225.  See id.  
226.  See id. 
227.  See id. 
228.  See id. 
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not provide a prenuptial agreement or will.229  It is also important to note 
that the statute states a will is subject to a prenuptial agreement, and 
gives no other legal device this authority.230 
Title 43, section 121 specifically addresses how property is to be 
distributed upon divorce.231  Section 121 gives the court the authority to 
make an equitable distribution of property acquired jointly during 
marriage, whether the title of the property is “in either or both of the 
said parties,” as the court sees fit.232  The statute, however, places a 
limitation on this power of the court; the court must give effect to a 
valid prenuptial agreement.233  As in title 84, section 44, the court’s 
equitable division authority is subject to a prenuptial agreement, and no 
other devices are similarly listed.234 
Both title 84, section 44 and title 43, section 121 explicitly address 
only prenuptial agreements and not postnuptial agreements.235  When 
considering basic principles of statutory construction, it is important that 
the only listed exception to both statutes is the existence of a prenuptial 
agreement.  “The primary goal of statutory construction is to determine 
legislative intent,”236 and the legal maxim “expressio unius est exclusio 
alterius” is used to determine legislative intent.237  This maxim stands 
for the proposition that “the mention of one thing in a statute impliedly 
excludes another thing.”238  Since Oklahoma does not publish legislative 
history, application of this legal maxim is particularly appropriate in 
determining the legislature’s intentions through both title 84, section 44 
and title 43, section 121.  Since the two statutes call specifically for 
                                                                                                                 
229.  See id.  
230.  See id. 
231.  43 OKLA. STAT. ' 121 (Supp. 2007). 
232.  Id. 
233.  See id. 
234.  See id. 
235.  See 84 OKLA. STAT. ' 44 (2001); 43 OKLA. STAT. ' 121; Atkinson v. Barr, 1967 OK 
103, 428 P.2d 316 (Okla. 1967). 
236.  TXO Production Corp. v. Oklahoma Corp. Comm’n, 1992 OK 39, &7, 829 P.2d 
964, 968-69 (Okla. 1992). 
237.  R.R. Tway, Inc. v. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 1995 OK 129, & 17, 910 P.2d 972, 977 
(Okla. 1995). 
238.  Pub. Serv. Co. of Okla. v. State ex rel. Corp. Comm’n, 1992 OK 153, & 16, 842 
P.2d 750, 753.  The Oklahoma Supreme Court continued describing this legal maxim by 
stating: “The maxim is to be applied only as an aid in arriving at intention and should never 
be followed to the extent of overriding a different legislative intent.” Id.  Since Oklahoma 
does not provide legislative history, it seems the only way application of the maxim could be 
found to override legislative intent would be if language as explicit as that empowering 
prenuptial agreements existed elsewhere in the statutes. 
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prenuptial agreements as a limitation to either a will or the court’s 
equitable division power, the statutes impliedly exclude postnuptial 
agreements as another limitation.  Postnuptial agreements are not 
explicitly mentioned anywhere else in the Oklahoma statutes.  Thus, a 
postnuptial agreement that is used to create a new marital contract 
appears to violate both title 84, section 44 and title 43, section 121, and 
is therefore unenforceable. 
2. The Proper Application of Oklahoma’s Statutes With Regard to 
Postnuptial Validity 
Revisiting the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s decision and analysis in 
Atkinson serves as a guide in ascertaining how postnuptial agreements 
should be treated under Oklahoma’s current law.  In addition to 
Atkinson, Oklahoma’s policy of favoring marital agreements will help 
determine how postnuptial agreements should be treated in Oklahoma.  
After considering the language of title 84, section 44 and title 43, 
section 121, Atkinson’s analysis, and Oklahoma’s favorable treatment of 
marital agreements, determining postnuptial validity will ultimately 
hinge on the use of the postnuptial agreement: either as a modification 
to a prenuptial agreement or as a means to create a new marital 
agreement between spouses. 
In Atkinson, the court held the wife’s heirs were arguing the quit-
claim deed served as postnuptial agreement to waive the husband’s 
statutory rights of inheritance.239  Thus, the postnuptial agreement would 
have served to create an entirely new marital agreement.240  The 
Atkinson court relied on title 84, section 44 for guidance in addressing 
postnuptial validity and did not discuss whether a postnuptial agreement 
could be used to modify a prenuptial agreement.241  The court simply 
stated, “[a] postnuptial agreement of a husband and wife not to dissent 
from the will of the other, and waiving the right of the husband or wife 
to take the other’s estate under the law of intestate succession, is not 
authorized by statute and is invalid and unenforceable.”242  Thus, the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court made clear that title 84, section 44 makes a 
will subservient to a prenuptial agreement only, and not to postnuptial 
agreements, as well.243  Because Atkinson dealt with a situation where a 
                                                                                                                 
239.  Atkinson v. Barr, 1967 OK 103, & 23, 428 P.2d 316, 320 (Okla. 1967).  
240.  Id. 
241.  See id. & 29, 428 P.2d at 320-21. 
242.  Id. (quoting Crane v. Howard, 1951 OK 282, & 0, 243 P.2d 998, 999). 
243.  See Id. 
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postnuptial agreement was used to create an entirely new marital 
agreement, it is unclear whether the holding and analysis of Atkinson 
controls in situations where a postnuptial agreement is used to modify 
an existing prenuptial agreement. 
Considering the uncertainty of Atkinson’s applicability to situations 
where the use of a postnuptial agreement is to simply modify a 
prenuptial agreement, and that the language of both title 84, section 44 
and title 43, section 121 fails to provide an explicit answer for this 
situation, a gap exists for the Oklahoma courts to fill with common law 
principles.  An understanding of Oklahoma’s position of favoring 
marital agreements helps to provide guidance on how courts should fill 
this gap left by the legislature. 
As a whole, the state of Oklahoma, through both its judicial and 
legislative branches, favors the use of marital contracts between 
spouses.244  Historically, however, this was not the case; women were 
viewed with an attitude of paternalism.245  Thus, courts were very 
skeptical of any form of marital agreement.  Specifically, prenuptial 
agreements were once viewed as “a wicked device to evade the laws 
applicable to marriage relations, property rights, and divorces. . . .”246  
This view of marital contracts, however, began to change.  Women were 
no longer seen as insensible or especially vulnerable “to overreaching by 
their fiancés and in need of special judicial protection.”247  The 
Oklahoma Supreme Court recognized this change in attitude in 1935 
when it stated that prenuptial agreements were favored by law.248  In 
addition to being favored by law, the areas a prenuptial agreement can 
cover have expanded since their development in the twentieth century.249  
Although a prenuptial agreements that was made in contemplation of 
divorce was not per se unenforceable, in 1977 the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court made clear that prenuptial agreements were not unenforceable 
simply because they contemplated such divorce.250 
The Oklahoma Legislature also continued to expand spouses’ ability 
to contract with one another when it enacted title 43, section 204, 
                                                                                                                 
244.  See 43 OKLA. STAT. ' 121 (Supp. 2007); 43 OKLA. STAT. ' 204 (2001); Manhart v. 
Manhart, 1986 Ok 12, & 29, 725 P.2d 1234, 1238 (Okla. 1986); Estate of Burgess, 1982 OK 
CIV APP 22, & 12, 646 P.2d 623, 625 (Okla. Civ. App.  Div. 1 1982). 
245.  Estate of Burgess, & 10, 646 P.2d at 625. 
246.  Id. 
247.  Id. & 12, 646 P.2d at 625. 
248.  Leonard v. Prentice, 1935 OK 427, & 17, 43 P.2d 776, 780 (Okla. 1935). 
249.  See discussion supra Part II.A. 
250.  Freeman v. Freeman, 1977 OK 110, & 2, 565 P.2d 365, 367 (Okla. 1977). 
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regarding transactions between spouses.251  “At common-law, Husband 
and Wife could not have contracted to convey Wife's [property] 
interest;” however, title 43, section 204 modified this common law 
rule.252  The Oklahoma Legislature further expanded the power of 
marital agreements when it amended title 43, section 121.253  Oklahoma 
courts had once held that a prenuptial agreement could not prohibit a 
court’s equitable division powers in divorce cases.254  In 1992, the 
Oklahoma Legislature amended title 43, section 121 by inserting 
“subject to a valid [prenuptial] contract in writing,” thus, making the 
court’s equitable division powers subject to a valid prenuptial 
agreement.255 
In addition to the judicial and legislative shifts toward favoring 
marital contracts, there are also many policy justifications that support 
the use of marital contracts.  For example, postnuptial agreements might 
actually foster the institution of marriage because without one, some 
couples might not be willing to marry since they would not be able to 
order their affairs as they see fit.256  Additionally, postnuptial 
agreements can help prevent future dispute among prospective spouses 
because they will know how each other’s property will be disposed of in 
the future.257  Similarly, use of postnuptial agreements help promote 
domestic happiness by allowing couples to privately resolve any 
potential conflict associated with distribution of property.258 
Over time, Oklahoma courts appear to almost advocate the use of 
marital contracts when the situation calls for one, showing great 
preference for their use.  Considering this attitude toward marital 
agreements in general, it seems that the use of a postnuptial agreement 
as a means to modify a prenuptial agreement is in line with Oklahoma’s 
policy of favoring these types of agreements and providing spouses the 
ability to control their own affairs.  Additionally, the two statutes 
relevant to distribution of property C title 84, section 44 and title 43, 
section 121 C require only that a valid prenuptial agreement be in 
                                                                                                                 
251.  See 43 OKLA. STAT. ' 204 (2001). 
252.  Manhart v. Manhart, 1986 Ok 12, & 29, 725 P.2d 1234, 1238 (Okla. 1986). 
253.  See 43 OKLA. STAT. ' 121 (Supp. 2007). 
254.  See Taylor v. Taylor, 1991 OK CIV APP 126, & 10-11, 832 P.2d 429, 431-32 
(Okla. Civ. App. Div. 1 1991). 
255.  See 43 OKLA. STAT. ' 121. 
256.  Estate of Burgess, 1982 OK CIV APP 22, & 13, 646 P.2d 623, 625-26 (Okla. Civ. 
App.  Div. 1 1982). 
257.  Id. & 14, 646 P.2d at 626. 
258.  See Leonard v. Prentice, 1935 OK 427, 43 P.2d 776 (Okla. 1935). 
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existence for a court to consider the marital contract when distributing 
property.259  Thus, in the situation where a marriage dissolves from 
death or divorce, and a couple has made a modification to a valid 
prenuptial agreement postnuptially, that prenuptial agreement was in 
existence when the couple was married.  Simply modifying the 
prenuptial agreement postnuptially need not change the fact that the 
prenuptial agreement was in existence before marriage, thus satisfying 
title 84, section 44 and title 43, section 121.  Further, it seems in line 
with Oklahoma’s policy towards favoring prenuptial agreements to 
consider a modification to a prenuptial agreement as nothing more than 
a reflection of the parties’ intention to continue to align their affairs as 
they see fit.  Additionally, the ability to modify the prenuptial agreement 
postnuptially serves Oklahoma’s desire for spouses to resolve private 
disputes privately. 
The court in Boyer was misguided in using title 43, section 204 to 
justify that a postnuptial agreement can modify a prenuptial agreement, 
while the Hendrick court relied on the proper statute C title 43, section 
121 C but came to the wrong conclusion, that prenuptial agreements 
could not be amended through postnuptial agreements.260  The court in 
Hendrick analogized that case with the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s 
decision in Atkinson.261  As addressed above, the law under Oklahoma 
should treat the use of postnuptial agreements differently depending on 
their use: either as a modification tool or a means to create an entirely 
new marital contract. 
The Hendrick court overlooked this distinction and chose to apply 
Atkinson, a case dealing with a postnuptial agreement attempting to 
create a new marital contract, to the distinguishable facts before it, 
which dealt with using a postnuptial agreement as a way to modify a 
prenuptial agreement.262  In addition to the incorrect use of Atkinson, the 
Hendrick court overlooked the policy of both Oklahoma’s legislature 
and judiciary of favoring marital contracts and disregarded the 
proposition that allowing modification of prenuptial agreements 
postnuptially serves to further the same policies that favor the use of 
marital contracts generally.  
                                                                                                                 
259.  See 43 OKLA. STAT. ' 121; 84 OKLA. STAT. ' 44 (2001). 
260.  Hendrick v. Hendrick, 1999 OK CIV APP 15, 976 P.2d 1071. 
261.  Id. & 16, 976 P.2d at 1073-74. 
262. See Atkinson v. Barr, 1967 OK 103, & 23, 428 P.2d 316, 320 (Okla. 1967); 
Hendrick, 1999 OK CIV APP 15, 976 P.2d 1071. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol63/iss4/9
2011] COMMENTS 817 
 
 
B. Proposed Changes to Oklahoma’s Statutes to Enhance Postnuptial 
Agreement Treatment 
The Oklahoma Legislature should consider amending title 84, section 
44 and title 43, section 121 to allow spouses to enter into entirely new 
marital contracts postnuptially.  Such an amendment would coincide 
with Oklahoma’s policy goals of giving married couples the ability to 
control their property, which is the same goal that is currently served by 
prenuptial agreements.  Prenuptial agreements receive favorable 
treatment in part because they help foster marriage;263 in certain 
situations postnuptial agreements can also help foster a couple’s 
decision to remain married.   Just as a prenuptial agreement helps foster 
marriage by providing couples that would not marry unless they could 
manage their affairs a means to accomplish their desired control, a 
postnuptial agreement can provide married couples a way to resolve 
disputes, which might end in divorce unless a resolution is found by 
allowing them the ability to control their property after marriage. 
In addition to promoting and sustaining marriage, postnuptial 
agreements that create new marital contracts can help not only sustain a 
marriage but can also create more amicable and loving marriages.  As 
noted earlier, spouses often want to use a postnuptial agreement, 
whether by amending a prenuptial agreement or creating a new marital 
agreement, to resolve problems that could not have been foreseen before 
marriage.  Allowing couples to create new marital contracts through a 
postnuptial agreement is simply a recognition of the reality that many 
couples do not know what their marriage will look like and what 
difficulties might arise.  Although many couples might not end their 
marriage over these unforeseen challenges, affording couples the ability 
to control their marriages would create a better living environment for 
them and other family member living in the same home C such as 
children. 
Amending title 84, section 44 and title 43, section 121 would not 
require a total statutory overhaul, but simply an insertion into the 
already existing statutory language.  Oklahoma could use Alabama’s 
statute relevant to postnuptial agreement validity as a model for the 
amendments necessary to title 84, section 44 and title 43, section 121.  
The Alabama statute reads: “The right of election of a surviving spouse 
and the rights of the surviving spouse to homestead allowance, exempt 
                                                                                                                 
263.  Griffin v. Griffin, 2004 OK CIV APP 58, & 17, 94 P.3d 96, 100 (Okla. Civ. App.  
Div. 3 2004). 
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property and family allowance, or any of them, may be waived, wholly 
or partially, before or after marriage . . . .”264 
For title 84, section 44 and title 43, section 121 only the words “or 
postnuptial” would need to be inserted into the respective statutes.  
Thus, title 84, section 44(b)(1) would read: “Every estate in property 
may be disposed of by will except that a will shall be subservient to any 
antenuptial or postnuptial marriage contract in writing.”  Title 43, 
section 121 would read: “As to such property, whether real or personal, 
which has been acquired by the parties jointly during their marriage, 
whether the title thereto be in either or both of said parties, the court 
shall, subject to a valid [antenuptial] or postnuptial contract in 
writing . . . .” 
If Oklahoma makes amendments to title 84, section 44 and title 43, 
section 121, courts should impose similar requirements to those it 
imposes on prenuptial agreements to determine on a case-by-case basis 
if a specific postnuptial agreement is valid.  The requirements that make 
a prenuptial agreement valid can be employed on postnuptial agreements 
that create new marital contracts to ensure one party is not being unduly 
taken advantage of.  Because courts already consider spouses to be in a 
confidential relationship and the status of a confidential relationship 
requires spouses to act as fiduciaries, spouses creating a new marital 
contract through a postnuptial agreement would already be under a duty 
to act as fiduciaries.  Just as courts require that prenuptial agreements be 
entered into voluntarily to satisfy the duty of spouses to act as 
fiduciaries, so should a court require that spouses enter into a 
postnuptial agreement voluntarily. 
The requirement of voluntariness would help address the concern that 
one spouse was exercising undue influence over the other when creating 
a new marital agreement through a postnuptial agreement.  When a court 
considers the elements of voluntariness C (1) time given to sign the 
agreement; (2) ability to consult independent counsel; and (3) presence 
of fraud, misrepresentation, and duress265 C it is effectively protecting 
the interests of either spouse and ensuring the postnuptial agreement was 
entered into validly.  The other requirements of prenuptial agreements, 
(1) the agreement is not against public policy, (2) there is a full and fair 
disclosure of assets, and (3) the agreement is substantively fair and 
                                                                                                                 
264.  ALA. CODE ' 43-8-72 (West 2009). 
265.  See part II.B.2 for further discussion of each individual element of voluntariness. 
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conscionable, can all be equally applied to a postnuptial agreement 
creating a new marital agreement.  
 VI. Conclusion 
Given the uncertainty of treatment of postnuptial agreements under 
both Oklahoma’s statutory and common law, it is important to 
understand what Oklahoma’s statutory law covers, Oklahoma’s attitude 
toward marital agreements, and justifications for postnuptial 
agreements.  Spouses increasingly attempt to control their property 
rights within a marriage, through both pre- and postnuptial 
agreements.266  Because of this increase in both forms of marital 
contracts it is important to understand how Oklahoma law treats both 
agreements.  Although prenuptial agreements are clearly favored under 
Oklahoma law, the treatment of postnuptial agreements is unclear. 
Whether postnuptial agreements are valid under Oklahoma law hinges 
on the use of the postnuptial agreement: either as a way to modify a 
prenuptial agreement or as a way to create an entirely new marital 
contract.  Based on Oklahoma’s statutes relevant to postnuptial 
agreement validity, title 84, section 44 and title 43, section 121, both 
statutes seem to create a gap in legislative intent when a postnuptial 
agreement is employed as a way to modify a prenuptial agreement C a 
gap that must be filled by common law principles.267  Considering 
Oklahoma’s policy of favoring marital agreements because these 
agreements allow parties to align their affairs as they please, and help 
foster marriage and resolve marital disputes privately, it is likely that 
Oklahoma courts will fill this gap in Oklahoma’s postnuptial statutes by 
holding that a prenuptial agreement can be modified through use of a 
postnuptial agreement.268  Additionally, allowing postnuptial agreements 
to be used in such a way serves the same goals that justify the initial use 
of prenuptial agreements. 
Although postnuptial agreements modifying prenuptial agreements 
are likely to be valid under Oklahoma law, postnuptial agreements that 
create entirely new marital agreements are likely prohibited under 
                                                                                                                 
266. See Jean Chatzky, For Richer or Poorer, Unless We Get Divorced 1 (2006), 
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/moneymag/moneymag_archive/2006/04/01/8373333/index
.htm; Robert DiGiacomo, Quit Fighting B Get a Postnuptial Agreement 1 (2008), http:// 
www.cnn.com/2008/LIVING/personal/04/02/postnuptial.agreement/index.html. 
267.  See 43 OKLA. STAT. ' 121 (Supp. 2007); 84 OKLA. STAT. ' 44 (2001). 
268. See Estate of Burgess, 1982 OK CIV APP 22, & 13, 646 P.2d 623, 625-26 (Okla. 
Civ. App.  Div. 1 1982); Leonard v. Prentice, 1935 OK 427, 43 P.2d 776 (Okla. 1935). 
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Oklahoma’s current statutory scheme.  Oklahoma’s statutes clearly state 
that a court’s ability to distribute property at the dissolution of a 
marriage, from divorce or death, is subject only to a valid prenuptial 
agreement C not a postnuptial agreement.269  Oklahoma law as it stands 
likely prohibits using a postnuptial agreement to create a new marital 
contract; however, this does not reflect Oklahoma’s policy toward 
favoring marital contracts.  Oklahoma should amend title 84, section 44 
and title 43, section 121 to give spouses the ability to use postnuptial 
agreements to create new marital agreements.  Giving spouses this 
ability will not only mirror Oklahoma’s policy of favoring marital 
agreements, but it could also offer spouses another way to resolve 
marital disputes C disputes that might otherwise end in divorce had 
spouses not been given the ability to control their property. 
 
 Stephen T. Gary 
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